




REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON THE TEN YEARS OF THE AFRICAN UNION POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

19-21 October 2016
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia



A REFLECTION ON PROGRESS

Opportunities and Challenges

Contents

Acronyms and abbreviations	i
Foreword	ii
Acknowledgement	iii
Introduction	1
Workshop Objectives and Outputs	2
Format and Approaches	3
Remarks made during the Opening Ceremony	4
Overview of the African Union Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy	6
Introduction	6
Presentations and Discussions	6
Observations and Emerging Issues	8
Recommendations	8
Role of the African Union Liaison Offices in supporting the Implementation of the African Union	
Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy	9
Introduction	9
Presentations and Discussions	9
Observations and Emerging Issues	11
Recommendations	12
From Stabilisation to Peacebuilding: the Dynamics of Managing Transitions from	
Stabilisation to Long-term Peacebuilding	13
Introduction	13
Presentations and Discussions	13
Observations and Emerging Issues	14
Recommendations	14
Security: Disarmament, Reintegration and Reinsertion and Security Sector Reform	16
Introduction	16
Presentations and Discussions	16
Observations and Emerging Issues	17
Recommendations	17
Humanitarian and Emergency Assistance	18

Introduction	18
Presentations and Discussions	18
Observations and Emerging Issues	19
Recommendations	19
Political Governance and Transitions	20
Introduction	20
Presentation and Discussions	20
Observations and Emerging Issues	21
Recommendations	21
Socio-economic Reconstruction and Development	22
Introduction	22
Presentations and Discussions	22
Observations and Emerging Issues	23
Recommendations	23
Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation	25
Introduction	25
Presentations and Discussions	25
Observations and Emerging Issues	26
Recommendations	26
Women, Gender and Youth	27
Introduction	27
On Women and Gender	27
Observations and Emerging Issues	28
Recommendations	28
On Youth	29
Observations and Emerging Issues	29
Recommendations	29
Partnerships	30
Introduction	30
Presentations and Discussions	30
Observations and Emerging Issues	30

Recommendations 31

Conclusion 32

Programme 34

Table 1: List of Participants 39

Acronyms and abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AGA	African Governance Architecture
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASI	African Solidarity Initiative
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AULO	AU Liaison Office
CAR	Central African Republic
CIMIC	Civil Military Coordination
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
HDIs	Human Development Index
HQ	Headquarters
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IOs	International Organisations
NDB	New Development Bank
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSD	Peace and Security Department
PSOs	Peace Support Operations
PSPs	Peace Strengthening Projects
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
RECs/RMs	Regional Economic Communities/ Regional Mechanisms
SRCC	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations

Foreword

I am pleased to present the report on the Workshop to mark Ten Years of the implementation of the African Union (AU) Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Policy. The AU PCRD Policy aims to support the efforts of post-conflict countries in consolidating peace and preventing relapse into conflict through the implementation of comprehensive, inclusive, nationally owned processes designed for their short-, medium- and long-term stabilisation, recovery, reconstruction and development. Moreover, these processes provide unique opportunities for building confidence in new political systems that include all segments of society in the reconstruction and development processes in the concerned countries.



Since the adoption of the policy in Banjul, the Gambia in 2006, the Commission has been developing a dynamic peacebuilding architecture that guarantees comprehensive implementation approaches at continental, national, local and community levels. This has allowed the creation of conducive environments for sustainable peace, based on the principles and values of equality, human dignity, respect for fundamental human rights, and provision of basic physical, legal and economic security to affected populations.

The tenth anniversary workshop which sought to take stock of the policy's implementation, was also designed to obtain inputs from a wide range of stakeholders for the conceptualisation of an action plan for the PCRD policy which has, since 2013, been aligned with and mainstreamed into Africa's strategic vision of 'Silencing the Guns' by 2020 and Agenda 2063 that envisions a socio-economic transformation of Africa through sustained growth and development.

The outcome of the workshop deliberations contained in this report, therefore, provides the needed compass to enhance the implementation efforts of the African Union Commission and its partners in the successful implementation of the PCRD Policy in an ever-changing post-conflict landscape; and put Africa on the right path to silencing the guns and achieving a conflict-free, peaceful, progressive and integrated Africa by 2063.

I, therefore, call upon all stakeholders at the continental, regional, national and local levels to draw lessons and recommend conclusions from this report from which a five-year action plan will be developed to facilitate an accelerated implementation of the AU PCRD Policy.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S. Chergui', written in a cursive style.

Ambassador Smail Chergui

Commissioner: Peace and Security, African Union Commission

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

25 December 2016

Acknowledgement

The Crisis Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division (CMPCRD) of the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the African Union Commission (AUC) extends its appreciation to the Inter-departmental Task Force on Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development for providing strategic direction and technical support towards the successful holding of the workshop to mark ten years of the AU PCR Policy. Since its inauguration in May 2016, the Task Force ensures the harmonisation and coordination of synergies in the work of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities and Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) in implementing the AU PCR Policy.

The Department recognises the Embassy of Denmark in Addis Ababa for their generous financial support that made it possible for the holding of the workshop. It also wishes to express its gratitude to the Norwegian funded Training for Peace Programme, which consists of an international network of partners including the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, the Institute for Security Studies and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Introduction

Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Development (PCRD) and peacebuilding are some of the most important challenges facing African countries emerging from conflicts. As the AU continues to make progress in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, the imperative for comprehensive and integrated actions and plans for the recovery, reconstruction and development of societies recovering from conflicts becomes paramount.

The AU PCRD Policy (2006) is the AU's main entry point in peacebuilding matters, being the authoritative policy that addresses the needs of communities emerging from conflicts and supports the process of sustaining peace. Guided by the Executive Council Decision EX.CL/191 (VII) of July 2005, it was drafted with the intention to assist African countries in the process of consolidating peace and preventing a relapse into conflicts down the road. The AU PCRD Policy is underpinned by five core principles namely; African leadership, national and local ownership, inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination, cooperation and cohesion, and capacity building for sustainability. The five core principles embody the fundamental values and standards that underpin all PCRD processes and activities so as to ensure that PCRD activities address the root causes of conflict, contribute to the creation of sustainable peace, social justice, renewal and participatory governance.

Ten years after its establishment, the AU PCRD policy framework is embedded within a wider context of the AU's support to Africa's strategic vision. The AU's ad hoc experience in different situations has highlighted the need to address PCRD as part of a holistic process, with activities ranging from conflict prevention, management and resolution, peace support operations, reconciliation, reconstruction and beyond.

Workshop Objectives and Outputs

The workshop objectives were to provide a platform for participants—representatives of the AUC, Regional Economic Communities/ Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Private Sector, Media and the Academia to reflect on lessons learned, and deliberate on the way forward as well as facilitate discussions to guide the development of a common strategic plan for the accelerated implementation of the AU PCRD Policy.

A key outcome of the workshop was a joint understanding among all participating parties of practical PCRD measures implemented during the last ten years with a comprehensive analysis of key areas of achievement, best practices and lessons learned. It also identified emerging challenges and new threats, but also opportunities and innovative approaches offered by the evolving African peacebuilding environment. Participants also agreed on measures to support the development of appropriate capacity building and organisational transformation strategy of the AU, RECs/ RMs and Member States for more effective peacebuilding and PCRD implementation.



Format and Approaches

The workshop utilised a combination of panel presentations and discussions. The first two workshop days were devoted to an in-depth analysis of ten years of implementing the six pillars of the PCRDR Policy, while the third day focused on the role of, and the contributions from partners such as the United Nations (UN), RECs/RMs, African Development Bank (AfDB), World Bank (WB) and CSOs in the implementation of the PCRDR Policy. Panelists were eminent persons, academics and practitioners with extensive knowledge and hands-on experience with respect to the various pillars of the PCRDR Policy and its integration with the wider African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) framework.

During the first session, speakers and panelists offered the participants a general overview of the PCRDR Policy and the emerging Peacebuilding Architecture. The session which provided a trajectory of the AU's PCRDR efforts since its establishment to the present, chronicled the efforts made, challenges faced and prospects for the future. The objective of this session was to elicit suggestions and recommendations on how the efforts of the PCRDR could be better enhanced to meet the actual needs of post-conflict countries on the continent. In the second session, Partners shared experiences of their PCRDR engagements and made concrete suggestions on possible areas of support and collaboration to the AU's PCRDR efforts.

This report outlines the deliberations of the workshop sessions. It consists of seven chapters made up of this introductory chapter, and six additional chapters structured along the pillars of the PCRDR policy namely; Security, Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Security Sector Governance, Humanitarian and Emergency Assistance, Political Governance and Transitions, Socio-economic Reconstruction and Development, Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation, and Women, Youth and Gender. It also includes recommendations for sustaining partnerships on peacebuilding with lessons learned and the way forward.

CHAPTER I

Remarks made during the Opening Ceremony

Dr. Admore Kambudzi, Acting Director, Peace and Security Department, welcomed all participants to the workshop and invited the Commissioner for Peace and Security, His Excellency Ambassador Smail Chergui, to make his opening remarks.

In his speech, Ambassador Chergui seized the opportunity to acknowledge the added value in taking the opportunity to reflect on ten years of the implementation of the PCRDR Policy and the opportunity for a more effective implementation in the coming years while taking into consideration the evolving global peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction discourse and how it impacts the AU's response in light of interconnected strategic, structural and operational challenges.

Ambassador Chergui highlighted some of the achievements since the adoption of the PCRDR Policy which include conducting needs assessments that have informed the design and implementation of joint activities in support of implementing peace agreements in Member States emerging from conflict, consolidating and scaling up security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration initiatives and sustained collaboration with RECs/RMs and CSOs. He stated that even though the modality of engagements with local communities have been largely through implementing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Peace Strengthening Projects (PSPs) in areas of deployment of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs), and through the AU Liaison Offices (AULOs). A dominant characteristic of all such engagements has been the efforts to facilitate the integration and mainstreaming of gender. According to him, the prominent role for women in post-conflict settings is an imperative to ensure that due consideration is given to their interests and needs in PCRDR activities. Ambassador Chergui pledged that in line with the AU's commitment to foster women's empowerment and gender equality, the Commission will continue to undertake initiatives in post-conflict countries to promote women's participation in democratic processes and institutions.

Lastly, Ambassador Chergui reiterated that the AU and the UN Peacebuilding Architectures should explore practical modalities of sharing experiences focusing on measures to develop appropriate tools for knowledge management and information sharing that can empower the continental and regional mechanisms to respond to PCRDR Policy implementation initiatives. With a view to building synergies and ensuring concrete implementation and results based on comparative advantages of both the AU and the UN, Ambassador Chergui proposed the holding of an annual meeting between both organisations to share experiences, lessons learned and progress on the implementation of the PCRDR Policy.

In concluding, Ambassador Chergui drew attention to the innovation of the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI), which seeks to promote a paradigm shift that promotes African self-reliance driven by the motto: "Africa helping Africa". He drew attention to the uniqueness of the ASI, which provides opportunities for Africa to generate additional "out-of-the-box" ideas for addressing post-conflict reconstruction and development challenges and contribute towards a renewed sense of promoting intra-African solutions to the complex challenges of post-conflict reconstruction and development. Expressing optimism that the ASI will galvanise the private sector as an important stakeholder in reconstruction and socio-economic development, he also encouraged the sector to be mindful of the need for local perspectives and empowerment of the marginalised in planning and implementing peacebuilding interventions. According to him, even though the effort to involve local communities and convert their in-kind contribution and indigenous knowledge into coherent plans and programmes requires patience and greater resources, the payoffs make it worthy as local participation in socio-economic reconstruction is critical to sustaining peace.

In her Keynote Address, the Chair of the Peace and Security Council for the month of October, Her Excellency Ambassador Catherine Muigai Mwangi recounted the explicit determination made by the founding fathers of the AU in the Constitutive Act to tackle the multifaceted challenges confronting the continent, consolidate the democratic process which had begun, and ensure good governance and the rule of law – which are pre-requisites to promoting peace, security and stability and are also elements required for the socio-economic development of Africa. Against that backdrop, Ambassador Mwangi underlined the fact that although much has been done to silence the guns, several conditions for preventing their re-introduction have not always been effectively addressed. In effect, the democratic



Ambassador Catherine Mwangi, PSC Chair for the month of October

gains made are not being consolidated. She further admonished that until steps are taken to effectively tackle the challenges of state building and consolidation confronting many of the countries on the continent, there is a risk of a retrogressing on the gains made. Highlighting the risk of relapse in post-conflict countries in the absence of timely reconstruction, development and stabilisation efforts, Ambassador Mwangi drew attention to the fact that such risks become even more heightened in the many instances when relapse begins with latent, sporadic and localised violence that may not always receive the attention of the international community until much later, when there is further deterioration. She recognised the political complexities that bedevil PCRDR efforts and praised the establishment of Liaison Offices in a number of countries where a local presence is critical.

In implementing the PCRDR Policy, Ambassador Mwangi noted the political complexities that the organisation has to mediate and navigate with Member States and external stakeholders.

In concluding, Ambassador Mwangi bemoaned the critical human and financial challenges both at the headquarters and in the Liaison Offices that negatively affect PCRDR efforts. She expressed hope that the revitalised PSC sub-committee on PCRDR would work closely with the other mechanisms mentioned in the 2007 Decision of the Executive Council, to provide the needed political support to PCRDR implementation. According to her, a closer, systematic engagement with regional bodies which would encourage an acceleration by the RECs/RMs of the development of operational guidelines of the adopted policy framework; the effective utilisation of African expertise in the post-conflict reconstruction efforts and in particular, the continued development of the database of African experts on PCRDR, is crucial to peace consolidation efforts. She commended the relations between the AUC and CSOs that is being nurtured and would be enhanced through the provision of a formal platform.

In his speech, Ambassador Kamau Macharia, President of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and Kenya's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, acknowledged the work and investments in time and resources needed for effective peacebuilding on the one hand, and the multiplicity of the challenges confronting the continent on the other, recommended the development of an enduring partnership between the AUC and the PBC.

According to him, one of the key lessons learned by the AU and shared with the rest of the world is the need to exhaust non-military options in addressing political challenges. Juxtaposing the instances when the international community had resorted to the use of force against Africa's use of non-violent means, Ambassador Macharia concluded that the former options had tended to result in further deterioration of the security situation, damaged social cohesion, facilitated economic collapse and led to social implosion. Reminding the workshop participants of the primacy of politics, he mentioned that failures abound in situations where politics have been abandoned. He flagged the issue of youth and women and encouraged the AU to recognise the centrality of youth as a critical resource in the quest for sustainable development and peace. This recognition according to the ambassador had bolstered the interventions of the UN, especially within the context of the PBC.

Ambassador Macharia noted that even though a number of frameworks including the UN Agenda 2030 and the AU's Agenda 2063 highlight the challenges of inequalities within and among countries and calls for the creation of development pathways that lessens inequalities, the existing financial challenges of countries pose obstacles to the realisation of sustainable economic growth, peace and development on the continent. He, therefore, welcomed the AU's decision to adopt a Peace Fund to provide some of the critical resources for addressing challenges on the continent. According to him, the creation of the Peacebuilding Fund, which works in over twenty countries in the world and has six country configurations in Africa, has enabled the PBC to be more responsive and provide targeted interventions in many local communities where other UN agencies may not be able or willing to fund. Concluding his remarks, the President of the PBC stressed the need for more investment in prevention not just in post-conflict countries but in all countries in general.

CHAPTER II

Overview of the African Union Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy

Introduction



Dr. Sarjoh Bah, Head, CMPCRD

This chapter highlights the presentation made by Alhaji Sarjoh Bah, Acting Head, Crisis Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division (CMPCRD) in the Peace and Security Department. It provides a trajectory of the AU PCRDR's efforts since its establishment to the present and chronicles the efforts made, the challenges encountered and prospects for the future. The objective of this session was to elicit suggestions and recommendations on how the efforts of the PCRDR could be better enhanced to meet the actual needs of post-conflict countries on the continent.

Since its adoption in 2006, several conceptual considerations have guided the implementation of the AU PCRDR Policy. Key among these is a realisation that PCRDR is as much political as it is technical and as such, requires parallel processes that reduce the risk of relapse on the one hand, and facilitate state building and consolidation on the other. Notwithstanding this realisation, it is noticeable that the advances and new thinking on peacebuilding have not always been fully reflected in the practice of building peace. This gap stems mainly from the failure of multilateral organisations and peacebuilding practitioners to fully integrate the basis of state-society relations namely legitimacy, accountability and the delivery of public goods and services into the peacebuilding agenda in a holistic and comprehensive manner.

Acknowledging that “The Africa We Want” can only be created through a comprehensive and integrated approach, the 2016-2020 Roadmap for the APSA provides an inclusive approach to addressing conflict prevention, conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction and development, strategic security issues, and coordination and partnerships in a manner that makes it possible to leverage the strengths of the various processes to realise the objectives of “Silencing the Guns by 2020”. Within the APSA framework, the AU pursues post-conflict reconstruction and development with a singular objective of elaborating measures to consolidate peace and promote sustainable development for countries that have experienced conflict. Such measures are undertaken within the framework of the PCRDR Policy by the AULOs.

Presentations and Discussions

In his presentation, Dr. Bah suggested that four fundamental considerations underpin PCRDR activities and processes. These, he said, are the primacy of politics, the need for well thought out and targeted interventions, the conceptualisation of PCRDR as a recovery plan akin to the Marshall plan and an acknowledgement by stakeholders that PCRDR is critical to the realisation of Agenda 2063 and to a peaceful and prosperous Africa. Chronicling the progress of implementation, he highlighted a number of policies and structures designed to aid the operationalisation of the AU PCRDR policy, including the establishment of an Inter-Departmental Task Force to coordinate PCRDR activities and the launch of a number of projects and activities in some post-conflict countries as part of the AUC's achievements. He also outlined some of the challenges confronting the effective implementation of the policy and provided some recommendations for consideration.

He noted that in operationalising the AU PCRDR policy, various Divisions within the Commissions of Peace and Security and Political Affairs have developed supporting policies that make it possible to ensure that relevant context-specific interventions are developed and implemented within a sufficiently secure environment that guarantees the security

of the investments made. Among the frameworks developed are the Quick Impact and Peace Strengthening Policy and Guidelines, the AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR), and the Transitional Justice Framework which is being finalised. To facilitate coherence at the strategic level in Addis Ababa, the Inter-Departmental Task Force on PCRDR, designed to harness synergies within the Peace and Security Department and AU Commission as a whole, was inaugurated in May 2016. The objective of the Task Force is to ensure effective coordination of strategic PCRDR policy guidance and implementation. This will ensure that the regional and continental peace and security architecture and mechanisms that have been put in place are robust enough to facilitate negotiations for peaceful resolution of existing conflicts, and the effective implementation of peace agreements, as witnessed in countries like Burundi, CAR, the Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Mali, South Sudan and Somalia.

Determined to ensure that communities enjoy the peace dividend and benefit from the AU's interventions, Dr. Bah highlighted the fact that Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Peace Strengthening Projects (PSPs) are implemented within the context of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and peacebuilding settings. These interventions, in his view, allow for some of the fundamental needs of affected communities to be met and, in the process, facilitate confidence building which ultimately assists in generating more strategic stabilisation outcomes. The QIPs and PSPs are undertaken in two phases, first, as part of AU PSOs where the QIPs would be short-term and secondly, as small-scale initiatives that are designed to deliver an impact by contributing to addressing the immediate needs during AU missions and as part of AU peacebuilding measures while PSPs are designed to be undertaken during stabilisation and possibly through to the development phase, with an anticipation of positive direct impact and effect on peacebuilding measures.

Dr. Bah argued that a project with great potential for replication in other regions is an AU-COMESA-KfW Cross-Border Trading for Peace Project. This Project, which ultimately aims at contributing to peace and stability efforts in concerned border regions, seeks to improve the living conditions of populations in border areas of post-conflict countries through the construction of cross-border infrastructures that will contribute to enhancing cross-border trade, and in the process, facilitate interaction between communities. Also included in this Project, are opportunities to enhance the capacity of stakeholders involved in cross-border trade facilitation including border officials, small-scale cross-border traders and border communities.

Intent on ensuring that its interventions are context-specific and responsive to the needs of the beneficiary countries, the Task Force on PCRDR has identified a number of countries in which needs assessments are to be undertaken. The aim of these needs assessments, the first of which was undertaken in August 2016 in the CAR, is to assess, in collaboration with the respective national governments, as well as regional and international partners, the status and priority needs for the reconstruction of the countries and to develop a comprehensive strategy and action plan that ensures complementarity rather than a duplication of international and regional efforts for reconstruction. The findings and recommendations of the PCRDR Needs Assessments will, among others, be useful in providing the AU with an updated status of the situation on the ground in the selected countries and the possible opportunities, priorities and avenues for support towards reconstruction and development. With such information, the AU would also be better placed to assist the affected countries in their resource mobilisation efforts by deploying its political leverage to mobilise its Member States in the spirit of African solidarity to support the identified countries through financial, technical, capacity and resources contributions.

Dr. Bah noted that the goal of PCRDR is to help support the rebuilding of the state, however, without the requisite resources, the AU's PCRDR efforts can only do so much. With severe limitations in both human and financial resources, the AUC is unable to effectively respond to all of the issues of post-conflict reconstruction on the continent and is therefore forced to choose areas of focus and issues of priority. Added to this, the sometimes weak interface between the AUC and the RECs/RMs that are instrumental in executing stabilisation and reconstruction efforts also hamper the effective implementation of the policy in post-conflict countries. Finally, an area in need of critical analysis is niche identification. Lessons learned from the last decade point to the fact that, given the multiplicity of actors in the field of PCRDR, there is a need for the AU to identify, carve and focus on a given area in which it has considerable strengths and leverage.

Dr. Bah concluded by noting that despite the challenges, opportunities have presented themselves in multiple forms over the last ten years. The PCRDR has gained deeper insights into the emerging peace and security challenges in post-conflict countries suffering power vacuums and post-conflict countries with ungoverned spaces. The AUC is able to leverage the common bonds between the APSA and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) through the Inter-

Departmental Task Force on PCRDR and is now better able to gauge national capacity deficits especially those pertaining to regionalised conflicts. Finally, he noted that the AUC has developed robust and more strategic partnerships with civil society, academia, media, private sectors and communities that ensure effective PCRDR Policy implementation.

Observations and Emerging Issues

Key issues were raised during the discussions that followed the plenary presentation.

1. There is a need to learn lessons from post-conflict countries where models of inter-ministerial task forces have worked well to coordinate national and local actors, juxtaposed with local decentralised governance where communities have a role to play in peacebuilding processes. It is expected that the documentation of best practices would assist in addressing many challenges related to PCRDR implementation of transitional justice mechanisms, local-external tensions, managing expectations with respect to service delivery.
2. In terms of a proposal put forward to consider reviewing the AU PCRDR Policy given the emerging issues on the continent, it was noted that the peacebuilding and PCRDR discourse and practice are broadly encapsulated in the APSA Roadmap (2016-2020), Agenda 2063 and Silencing the Guns by 2020. The AU's niche roles in the political sphere when engaging on the PCRDR Policy as facilitator and implementer sometimes present challenges which need to be addressed. However, in cascading into the other pillars, there is a need to reflect on how the AU and its partner institutions would best work to ensure an effective implementation of the PCRDR Policy.
3. As espoused in the PCRDR Policy, national ownership of all PCRDR and peacebuilding processes is crucial. In the context of the recent assessment mission to the CAR, the priorities of the Government remain key.
4. In concretely engaging with CSOs on the AU PCRDR Policy, there is a plan to establish a CSO-PCRDR platform.
5. In sharing best practices and lessons, two post-conflict countries have offered to undertake a study process that would inform PCRDR Policy implementation. This would guide the formulation and systematic collection and analysis of lessons learned on peacebuilding in Africa.

Recommendations

1. Within the framework of implementing the PCRDR Policy, there is a need to anchor all activities in the national vision of a post-conflict country. Where there are no national plans, the AU should support in developing a realistic and measurable plan with a view to sustaining peace and security where its niche and comparative advantage is its political leverage and accompanying role, and promoting the quality of leadership to guarantee peace and security.
2. As regards strengthening partnerships, there is a need to ascertain the best working model when engaging with other peacebuilding architectures. Recommendations were made to have a well-structured dialogue on the six pillars of the PCRDR Policy whereby inclusive and legitimate policies would be developed to tackle the various component of dimensions and sub-dimensions of peace and security at regional and national level where negotiation and democracy—issues on elections, security, justice, services, revenue and economy would need to be included.
3. The AU PCRDR partnership would also need to consider integrating international dialogue, co-chaired by Sierra Leone and Sweden. This would arguably strengthen harmonisation with African countries and could support the AU in developing indicators and policies.

“
The goal of PCRDR is to help support the rebuilding of the state, however, without the requisite resources, the AU's PCRDR efforts can only do so much.

”

CHAPTER III

Role of the African Union Liaison Offices in supporting the Implementation of the African Union Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy



Introduction

Following the adoption of the PCRD Policy, the AUC has taken a number of steps towards its implementation. These include the establishment of AU Liaison Offices (AULOs) in countries emerging from conflicts such as Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Comoros, CAR, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, South Sudan and Sudan. The AULOs have continued to engage with these countries and continuously followed up on the implementation of specific PCRD activities such as the implementation of QIPs and PSPs as well as the effective coordination of peace and stabilisation efforts.

Presentations and discussions

Setting off the panel discussion on the role of the AULOs in supporting the implementation of the PCRD Policy in post-conflict countries, the meeting was provided with the contextual background within which most of the AULOs operate. According to the information provided, there are great expectations both on the part of governments as well as the general citizenry on the role of the AULOs. These expectations are particularly high among the communities in the country that are confronted with many of the challenges arising from the conflict trap in which the country finds itself. Citing examples from the DRC, some of the innumerable challenges the AULOs are expected to address include the preservation of the rights of women and youth in Beni Territory in Eastern DRC where there are high incidents of gross human rights violations by armed groups. Another challenge, which the AULO in the DRC and elsewhere have to address, is the threats created by the combination of high unemployment, the negative effects of climate change on livelihoods, and the lure of a better life by jihadists. The drying up of Lake Chad was cited as an example of an environmental challenge that creates critical challenges for livelihoods in the Sahel region especially in countries along the Lake, and the lack of alternative sources of livelihoods makes the youth populations in that region vulnerable and susceptible to recruitment by jihadists such as the Boko Haram.

Other countries and regions faced with similar challenges were encouraged to learn from ideas that have proven successful in the Sahel region. Aware that the excuse of sovereignty could be used to limit the extent to which such lessons learned and innovations could be utilised by others, the AU was urged to play a more proactive role in encouraging peer-to-peer knowledge generation and implementation through its Africa Solidarity Initiative (ASI). Commenting on the concept of the Inter-Departmental Task Force on PCRDR, panelists lauded the innovation as it provides an opportunity to harness from the mandates of the different Divisions at the AUC, thereby making it possible to design comprehensive solutions to the multifaceted challenges of PCRDR. The AUC was encouraged to replicate this level of coordination at the level of the AULOs where there is a greater need for all actors to synergise in order to be more effective. Working to “deliver as one” was imperative to being able to address the multiple challenges confronting the promotion and protection of human rights, women’s rights, education and youth employment. Beyond discussing the issues, the AU was urged to work towards forming operational linkages to ensure visible outcomes.

Emphasis was placed on the centrality of governance in peacebuilding and, in this respect, the meeting applauded the political agreements negotiated in the DRC that could help usher peace for its people. Failure to implement these agreements could have lasting implications not only for the AU but also for the international community as a whole. The AU was therefore implored to double its leadership role in the DRC and use its political leverage to address some of the critical issues surrounding the holding of elections, de-escalating violence and the promotion of human rights among others.

The fact that PCRDR interventions often take place in situations that are not fully post-conflict or, which experience a relapse of conflict after being post-conflict for a while, was pointed out as one of the main challenges confronting the AU’s PCRDR efforts on the continent. South Sudan was cited as an example where a re-eruption of violence in December 2013 has altered its post-conflict status. In-depth insights were provided into the challenges that beset PCRDR efforts in such situations. In situations of such insecurity, there are threats to physical security, limiting the mobility and geographical scope of operations of PCRDR officers in the AULOs. They cannot operate outside of the capital city as the peripheral areas tend to be insecure and inaccessible. For instance, following the re-eruption of violence and consequent insecurity in South Sudan, two of the AU’s senior PCRDR officers were confined to Juba, unable to travel to the rural areas to implement designed PCRDR projects. Based on such experiences, the meeting made a strong call for a critical reflection on how to better implement PCRDR in situations where only parts of a country may be in post-conflict with violence occurring in other parts, or in situations of recurring violence as it becomes difficult to abandon citizens in such contexts when they need assistance the most. Moreover, the meeting warned against continued disregard of early warning signals, further stressing that the failure of early action could be disastrous for the countries in which AULOs are stationed and unravel the gains of PCRDR in those countries.

Reflecting on progress in the Great Lakes Region, the meeting deliberated on the achievements of PCRDR interventions in the Region. From the outset, attention was drawn to the fact that the AULO in Burundi had a peculiar character that was distinct from other AULOs because it had a dual mandate; to service the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) as a regional framework, and Burundi as a country within that regional framework. This peculiar character provided both opportunities and challenges that must be effectively analysed to ensure the optimisation of the opportunities and mitigation of the challenges on the work of the AU. The cooperation that has existed between the AU and the regional arrangements in East Africa in addressing challenges in the region were commended for their complementarity which is underpinned by the principle of subsidiarity. Special emphasis was placed on the imperative for subsidiaries to always work in tandem with complementary bodies so that in situations where subsidiarity may not be the most effective approach, the AU can still play a leading role as early as possible, to avert avoidable escalation. So, while there was recognition that the AU cannot stay too long and should not attempt to usurp the role of the regional

“ The meeting warned against continued disregard of early warning signals, further stressing that the failure of early action could be disastrous for the countries in which AULOs are stationed and unravel the gains of PCRDR in those countries. ”

arrangements, it could also not leave too soon as that could have devastating consequences. Gaining the required balance was something the AU had to work on in all situations.

The need to align the work of the AULO in Burundi to the AU PCRDR concept and policy was pointed out. This is crucial given that the establishment of the AULO in Bujumbura predates the development of the AU PCRDR Policy. There was, therefore, need to review the mandate of the Liaison Office to reflect the changes brought about by the policy. The primacy of politics in PCRDR was reiterated when it was stated that the success of PCRDR efforts was heavily dependent on the political will of all stakeholders. Furthermore, participants were asked to recognise and appreciate the fact that the elements of PCRDR are interdependent and must be implemented in a coordinated manner to ensure coherence. Thus, participants were cautioned against the creation of hierarchies in the implementation of PCRDR as that has the potential of devaluing the entire PCRDR process. Striking the right balance between the various elements in the prioritisation of PCRDR was imperative to ensuring that those issues that are fundamental to the existence and survival of the population and the state are not sacrificed for some others. Such a balance should also be mindful of the regional dimensions of conflict since contemporary intra-state conflicts are hardly confined to single territories.

Finally, in dealing with partnerships between the AU and the UN, there is a need to not only define added value but to also be clear in the division of labour that exists between the two organisations.

In concluding this session, participants were reminded that the PCRDR Policy is a strategic action framework that is extremely rich and well structured. However, despite the comprehensiveness of the policy, knowledge on it was limited to elite circles as most citizens on the continent are unaware of the concept. Out of such ignorance, the PCRDR Policy has not been referenced as the operational framework in post-conflict countries. For instance, neither Governments nor Civil Society Organisations acknowledge the PCRDR framework in their requests for support either from the AU or Partners. The situation was the same in interactions with International Organisations, EU, the UN and other continental organisations, as focus on the evolving AU PCRDR and peacebuilding architecture, including its policy, remain on the periphery of discussions. For instance, there is no specific recognition of the PCRDR Policy in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States despite the fact that the PCRDR policy would have more legitimacy and relevance if all actors considered it as the overarching framework of engagement in Africa.

The sessions concluded by calling on Africa's academia to engage more in the interrogation of the African doctrine on crises and economic situations. Panelists reiterated the need to improve the perception of the PCRDR within the African opinion, academia and international partners. Experience in Central Africa shows that the UN has the two largest peacekeeping missions in the DRC and CAR. However, the AU missed an opportunity when its mission—the AU-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA) transitioned to a UN mission, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). This transition would have allowed for the distribution of tasks between the EU, UN and the AU.

Observations and Emerging Issues

1. The challenges of the physical environment hinder mobility to areas with unfriendly terrains and thereby limits the geographical reach of PCRDR projects.
2. Very little is known of the AU's concept of PCRDR and the PCRDR Policy on the continent.
3. AU divisions working in post-conflict countries tend to work independently of one another.
4. Even though some PCRDR efforts are generic, each situation is unique and the AU has had to deal with some very specific and unique cases. These have not however been sufficiently documented to provide signposts for the future.
5. The six elements of the PCRDR Policy are interdependent and must be treated as such to facilitate coherence and optimise their benefits.
6. Although the AU does not have the same resources as other international organisations to undertake large-scale reconstruction and development efforts, it is however important to ensure that the basic infrastructure required for the security of the individual such as, potable water and decent accommodation among others, are in place to facilitate interaction and the creation of opportunities for basic economic security. They are imperatives for laying the foundation for sustainable peace.

7. Although the AU works well with its Partners, providing a clear division of labour and articulating the value added by the various partners is needed to enhance the effectiveness of cooperation.
8. The fragility of peace agreements in many countries requires that early action is taken when early warning information is provided.
9. Despite the multiple indications of political support for PCRDR at the strategic level, political will is largely lacking on the ground in most instances.

Recommendations

1. There is a need for the AU to coordinate its PCRDR programmes and projects with other Partners in order to benefit from the latter's support, when necessary. In this regard, the AUC needs to continue to work closely with the relevant UN peacebuilding instruments, including the UN Peacebuilding Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund. Furthermore, the AUC should engage with the World Bank, European Union, the New Development Bank and other international centres of knowledge on peacebuilding to negotiate the clear division of labour so as to enhance the value that each actor brings to the PCRDR effort.
2. There is a need to increase awareness on the AU PCRDR concept and policy within Africa, particularly among the broader community of practitioners and institutions working on peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and development on the continent. To achieve this, it is necessary to reflect the PCRDR policy and the role of AULOs in peace agreements concerning or involving their host countries. In addition, communication campaigns in post-conflict countries must include information on the role of the AULOs in order to sensitise citizens on their work and help to manage expectations of the AU. Furthermore, the AU should work towards ensuring a shared understanding of PCRDR across the AUC, between the PSC and the AUC, between the AUC and RECs/RMs, and within Member States and the Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) as such a synergy is critical to achieving concrete outcomes and maximising the impact of PCRDR efforts by the AU on the ground. To this end, a replication of the inter-departmental task force model at the headquarters in the field is highly recommended.
3. There is a need for the AU to document the lessons learned in all of its PCRDR efforts so as to be able to further interrogate some of its success stories to serve as good practices for other countries. For instance, it would be useful to document the lessons learned in tackling radicalisation in the Sahel so that other regions can study and adapt relevant aspects for addressing radicalisation in their contexts.
4. In order to ensure that there is predictable funding for PCRDR initiatives and for that matter consistent engagement from the AU on peacebuilding processes, the AU Peace Fund should include specific funding for PCRDR activities in Window 1 (Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation) and Window 3 (Peace Support Operations). These can be carried out as QIPs which is recommended to be reformulated as broader PCRDR projects by AULOs, Special Political Missions and Peace Support Operations. In addition, the Peace Fund should enable partners to pledge support for PCRDR projects and initiatives via the Peace Fund.
5. The AU must provide concrete political support to PCRDR processes on the ground by engaging in more practical ways at the strategic level with the various political actors, to influence the outcome of negotiations by the various AULOs as well as provide the needed backing to AULOs in the field.

“
Working to “deliver as one” was imperative to being able to address the multiple challenges confronting the promotion and protection of human rights, women’s rights, education and youth employment.”

CHAPTER IV

From Stabilisation to Peacebuilding: the Dynamics of Managing Transitions from Stabilisation to Long-term Peacebuilding

Introduction

In this session, the panelists highlighted the broad dynamics of managing transitions from initial stabilisation which often has a heavy military footprint to long-term peacebuilding with a focus on reconstruction, revitalisation of public service institutions and short-, to medium- term socio-economic and political development.

Presentations and discussions

In their deliberations on this subject matter, participants called for a critical consideration of the term “post-conflict” in the contemporary peace and security landscape with specific reference to the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is mandated among other things, to undertake state building, stabilisation and peacebuilding tasks. In this vein, the discussions focused on how state building can be undertaken in a situation of volatile conflict in Somalia. Transitioning from stabilisation to peacebuilding was highlighted as one of the fundamental challenges. So even though investment in civilian infrastructure such as schools and hospitals are imperatives for meaningful transitions, they also tend to be extremely high risk in volatile situations because of their susceptibility to attacks by armed groups. Consequently, in the face of such high insecurity, the humanitarian space becomes severely constricted thereby requiring the military, in some instances, to perform humanitarian roles.

The following were highlighted as signposts for managing transitions from stabilisation to long-term peacebuilding. First, the critical need for civil-military cooperation, especially in situations like Somalia where owing to the high level of insecurity, the military has had to deliver humanitarian services to populations in areas which are not accessible to humanitarian actors. Second, is the importance of ensuring that the efforts are made to concretise and consolidate the gains made for both the state and its population. The meeting was informed that the stabilisation attained in Somalia has made it possible to develop a structured approach for the transition through a division of labour between the AU, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the UN. As the AU focuses on consolidating the gains made in stabilising the country, the UN is focused on promoting peace and security, good politics, reconciliation and national dialogue, service delivery and economic recovery, sustainable governance resulting in the capacity to deliver peace and stability, administer justice, maintain law and order, and to allow people to move freely in liberated areas.

The challenge of unequal distribution of wealth and opportunities in post-conflict situations was highlighted as a potential source of conflict that needs to be addressed during transitions. Empowering the citizens through the promotion of justice, transparency and good governance, and the provision of psychosocial support as part of the new social contract is critical.

The workshop argued that the continent was reaching a ‘tipping point’ due to the convergence of five factors. These include: population explosion, urbanisation without industrialisation—meaning that those moving to cities struggle to find employment, effects of climate change induced migration, commodity slumps, and the global economic slow-down. Many urban centres on the continent have become prone to conflict because of unbridled migration, caused in part, by the lack of opportunities outside urban areas as well as the declining sources of traditional livelihoods such as farming due to the effects of climate change. Unable to find jobs, decent accommodation and meet their basic human needs, such migrants who are forced to the peripheries, create a restive belt around urban areas. The reliance of most African countries on commodities creates vulnerabilities as a slump in price tends to have negative consequences for economies on the continent. Finally, the global economic slowdown has limited resources for development and transformation on the continent. These challenges tend to be exacerbated in post-conflict situations because of the very limited resources available to the state, lack of systems for the equitable distribution of resources and

opportunities and sustainable development. The AU PCRDR policy principles of ‘African leadership’ and ‘ownership’ are critical to addressing the above-mentioned challenges. The meeting, therefore, concluded that the operationalisation of these two principles is dependent on the demonstration of genuine political will by both the strategic leaders and duty bearers at all levels of governance.

The meeting noted that the nature of contemporary post-conflict situations makes it particularly challenging to conceptualise PCRDR as a strictly post-conflict process. Examples from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Mali point to the fact that PCRDR would have to be undertaken even in situations where armed violence may be ongoing in some parts of a given post-conflict country. Against this background, it has become imperative to consider a shift from the chronological approach to peacebuilding which dictated that PCRDR efforts were deployed after PSOs and the inclusion of PCRDR into the mandate of PSOs. First, this would allow for the provision of the needed basic needs for the affected populations in order to enhance the efforts at “winning hearts and minds” in PSOs. Second, it would facilitate the transition from stabilisation to sustainable peace thereby contributing significantly to the development of seamless exit strategies for AU PSOs. Third, it would broaden the scope of intervention and make them less militaristic, as the civilian component of the PSOs could undertake the bulk of its activities through the provision of advice on peacebuilding approaches, concepts and tools to the mission leadership team, inputs into analysis and planning, liaising between offices and missions and between international partners as well as assisting with planning and oversight of PCRDR and peacebuilding activities.

There was a consensus that the sustainability of PCRDR and peacebuilding was highly dependent on investment in local capacities for peace. The meeting noted that even though the AU does not have as much resources as other actors engaged in PCRDR, it has a unique niche through which it serves very useful purposes. It, therefore, not only stressed the need for the AU to identify and develop its niche for its interventions to have a meaningful impact, but also identified for the mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the utility of its PCRDR interventions.

Observations and Emerging Issues

1. It was noted that the absence of PCRDR and peacebuilding provisions in the mandates of PSOs makes it difficult to undertake PCRDR in PSOs. This absence makes it even more difficult for a seamless transition from stabilisation to long-term peacebuilding.
2. There was a consensus that, although civil society has a role to play in the transition from stabilisation to long-term peacebuilding, there was a lack of clarity on how their engagement could be galvanised in a meaningful manner to positively impact PCRDR efforts, especially at the grassroots.
3. There was a recognition that PCRDR efforts needed to be planned, designed and implemented in a more scientific manner so as to be better able to achieve expected outcomes.
4. Although there is agreement that building national capacities is a prerequisite to long-term peacebuilding, it was noted that it has not been sufficiently prioritised in the implementation of the APSA framework.
5. There is a paradigmatic shift in the Non-Aligned Movement, which the AU must take cognisance of so as to ensure that the new normative underpinnings do not negatively affect Africa’s endeavours, especially towards long-term peacebuilding.
6. It was observed that the ECOSOCC presents an opportunity for engaging with civil society as well as the Peace and Security Council since it is working with the latter to operationalise the Livingstone formula.
7. There was an acknowledgement that even though there has been a decline in the number of violent conflicts on the continent, there are also nascent conflicts that are not being captured effectively.

Recommendations

1. PCRDR and especially its peacebuilding elements must be included in the mandates of AU PSOs so that there can be a seamless transition from stabilisation to long-term post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. In integrating peacebuilding and PCRDR, there exists a window for creating opportunities for non-coercive strategies.
2. There is a need to develop a structured framework for engagement with CSOs so as to effectively harness their

potential in enhancing efforts of PCRDR. In addition, there is a need to develop a planning tool for PCRDR and peacebuilding so as to ensure that interventions are needs-driven and can attain the expected outcome. Such a tool must have a component for monitoring and evaluating the utility of PCRDR activities in the affected countries.

3. The AU must focus on building the capacities of national authorities and institutions for sustainable long-term peacebuilding. The PCRDR efforts must also address the structural causes of conflict, and develop good governance in post-conflict countries in order to facilitate the establishment of requisite systems and structures for sustainable development, peace and security.

“ PCRDR and especially its peacebuilding elements must be included in the mandates of AU PSOs so that there can be a seamless transition from stabilisation to long-term post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. In integrating peacebuilding and PCRDR, there exists a window for creating opportunities for non-coercive strategies.”

CHAPTER V

Security: Disarmament, Reintegration, Reinsertion and Security Sector Reform

Introduction

A critical pre-requisite for post-conflict reconstruction is security. Freedom from fear and want are fundamental to building the confidence and trust required for all the processes of peacebuilding, reconstruction and state consolidation. This session, thus, provided an overview of assistance provided by the UN and the AU to post-conflict countries in enhancing security. The objective was to encourage recommendations on how the AU can assist post-conflict countries in a timely, structured and systematic way to facilitate freedom from fear and want.

Presentations and discussions

The success of PCRD and peacebuilding activities are dependent on a secure environment. A secure population will protect the investments of PCRD and peacebuilding. Yet, security is not just about protection from physical harm but rather, confidence and faith in the full spectrum of institutions of the rule of law. It was noted that, often, there is a heavy focus on the provision of physical security without comparable consideration for the provision of the procedural and substantive access to justice. Yet, access to justice means access to the law, effective law enforcement officials, a credible judiciary and a corrections system that is reformatory. The importance of establishing effective policing in the stabilisation phase was emphasised. This, it was stated, was critical for holding captured ground especially in situations where armed conflict may still be ongoing in other parts of the country where military presence may be required.

Establishing an effective police system as part of stabilisation missions was also necessary for the protection of civilians. In addition, as part of transforming those countries, it was important to set the right examples in post-conflict states by ensuring that separation of functions is clear and well respected and that each institution is able to perform its mandated duties effectively. To this end, an effective police system in the stabilisation phase of a mission was necessary for developing the capacity of the national police in the short-to-medium term. Following from the above, it was recommended that the police should be more involved in the AU's PCRD, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) as well as SSR interventions. Emphasis was placed on the need to ensure that policing and the role of the police generally should be integrated into the full spectrum of the APSA so that the requisite numbers and capabilities are generated and deployed as needed. A note of caution sounded was that when the police and its functions are not integrated into analysis and planning of PSOs and PCRD activities, it becomes an add-on and often does not function optimally because of the low numbers and capabilities. To this end, it was suggested that generating a common understanding of the advantages of policing, drawing on lessons learned from international experiences and focusing on better integrating of police into the wider PCRD/peacebuilding frameworks should be considered high priorities.

A fundamental issue raised during this session was the need for PCRD efforts being mindful of the status quo ante bellum. This, it was averred, was necessary to determining the types of interventions required to move an affected country from post-conflict to state building and ultimately, state consolidation. Attention was drawn to the fact that notwithstanding the dire capacity challenges in several countries, efforts at capacity development have largely been limited to "training" rather than long-term education. However, in some instances, the pre-conflict situation of states necessitates the need to address long-term educational needs rather than training. One area highlighted for critical attention in PCRD/peacebuilding efforts was the issue of constitutionalism. In view of the fact that most of the recent conflicts on the continent revolve around political contestations and constitutionalism, PCRD efforts need to identify the capacity needs required for constitution making, institution building and state building generally. Buttressing the need for strong institutions, the meeting was reminded that only robust institutions of the state can guarantee sustainable wealth creation by ensuring equitable distribution of public goods and wealth.

The relapse into conflict of almost half of post-conflict countries on the continent raised several questions on

the issue of SSR. The meeting noted that SSR could not be “touch-and-go”. Rather, it requires long-term holistic accompaniment to ensure that it is context specific and aligned to national needs and plans. To this end, it was recommended that the AU and its partners must ensure that DDR and SSR processes are effectively negotiated as part of peace processes. Again, the meeting strongly suggested that the AU should ensure that effective tools for monitoring and evaluating its DDR and SSR programmes are developed to guarantee that expected outcomes are attained. Two main points that run through the discussions in this session were, first, the need to rebuild trust between citizens and law enforcement institutions and second, the need to acknowledge the role of informal institutions in DDR and SSR processes. Enumerating, it was established that since the failure of rule of law was one of the underlying sources of conflict, citizens in post-conflict countries often have a complete lack of trust in law enforcement institutions. Building confidence in rule of law institutions was therefore as critical as the internal processes of reform. Again, since informal institutions provide almost 80% of justice and security in Africa, it was dishonest not to recognise them in DDR and SSR processes.

Observations and Emerging Issues

1. The processes of DDR on the continent are faced with multiple political and operational challenges that are encountered in the different phases. In many instances, disarmament and demobilisation are not included in peace agreements signed to end armed conflicts or their modalities and timelines are not adequately negotiated and agreed upon. Following peace settlements, the initiation of DDR programmes is undermined by, among others, the lack of political will on the part of the armed factions.
2. The absence of oversight mechanisms, national ownership and the lack of the requisite financial and operational capacities also lead to delays in the implementation of DDR programmes which put ex-combatants at the risk of recidivism and recruitment into criminal groups.
3. When DDR programmes are not adequately linked to broader national development plans, they cannot address long-term stabilisation.
4. The changing nature of DDR means that in recent times, DDR activities are being conducted in the absence of formal peace agreements as part of interim stabilisation interventions or counter-terrorism operations. Additionally, many conflicts on the continent are of a cross-border nature that entails repatriation and reintegration of ex-combatants to other countries.

Recommendations

1. Given that policing and access to justice are essential to avoid conflict relapse and radicalisation, the AU should promote a common understanding of policing and its added advantage, taking lessons from the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, External Review of the Functions, Structure and Capacity of the UN Police and UN Security Council Resolution 2185 on Policing. Furthermore, the AU should integrate policing into its APSA Roadmap, and ensure that its policies such as the PCR Policy, SSR Policy, ASF Doctrine, and other AU concepts towards good governance, peace and security, and PSO mandates have a policing consideration in analysis, planning and implementation.
2. Given that one of the key causes of conflict is failure of governance, focusing on strengthening institutions to ensure that citizens’ access to goods and services are prioritised. To address the resource curse that plagues much of the continent, the AU can play a role in crafting national strategies for managing commodities effectively that ensure citizens and workers are able to benefit from resource wealth.
3. To optimise the potential of SSR, it is important to ensure that the initiatives are context specific, holistic and sufficiently long-term that are incorporated into national frameworks. Adequate resources should also be allocated for the monitoring and evaluation of the relevance and sustainability of interventions.
4. The Member States and RECs should effectively include DDR in peace negotiations, as well as ensure that reintegration programmes are embedded into broader post-conflict recovery efforts. DDR programmes must also be planned in coordination with, and in support of, national SSR and reconciliation efforts, as well as socio-economic development policies.
5. Member States should assume greater ownership of their DDR programmes and devote the required human and financial resources to guarantee their success and minimise reliance on unpredictable international financing.

CHAPTER VI

Humanitarian and Emergency Assistance



Introduction

The objective of this session was to identify the structures and mechanisms in place for the AU to liaise effectively with institutions engaged in the provision of humanitarian/emergency assistance in a timely manner.

Presentations and discussions

The effectiveness of humanitarian and emergency assistance is dependent on timeliness, the relevance of assistance and the ability to reach those most affected. Touching on the issue of timeliness and ability to reach affected populations, there was a call for the AU to prioritise early interventions in disaster and emergency situations. Conscious of the resource constraints confronting the AU, there was a call for a closer working relationship with the UN and other multilateral actors that often have the logistical wherewithal to facilitate the provision and distribution of assistance in emergency situations.

Humanitarian and emergency assistance are relevant if they meet the needs of the affected populations. The meeting, therefore, strongly encouraged the AU to ensure that its response to emergency and disaster situations are relevant.

One way of ensuring that assistance was relevant, it was noted, was to work with CSOs that are often on the ground and have better knowledge and understanding of the needs of the affected populations.

Again, the point was made that given the AU's resource constraints, it was essential for it to carve out a niche in the area of humanitarian and emergency response so that it can focus and develop that area whilst other actors focused on other areas. It was noted that although the AU has provided significant assistance in many conflict and post-conflict situations, not much is known of its efforts. The AU, therefore, needs to increase its visibility in the field as well as enhance its sensitisation efforts so that local people are aware of its role in the provision of humanitarian and emergency assistance.

In addition, the need to translate the existing normative frameworks on humanitarian and emergency assistance was highlighted. Recognising the convening power of ECOSOCC, the emphasis was laid on the need for the CMPCRD to forge a closer relationship with it so as to be able to utilise its platform for engaging with CSOs.

It was also noted that beyond the provision of immediate humanitarian and emergency assistance, there was also a need to address some of the structural challenges that exacerbate vulnerabilities and thereby create a spiral of complex emergencies. In particular, it was suggested that gender considerations need to be factored into humanitarian and emergency assistance and often, the best way to do this, is through direct engagement in the field.

Concluding, the AU was urged to consider the appointment of a High Commissioner for Humanitarian Assistance and Emergencies to mobilise support, and garner encompassing political will through broad-based key stakeholder engagement that would include youth, women, civil society, as well as the private sector.

Observations and Emerging Issues

1. Although all African countries have disaster management offices that deal with disasters, it is only the Executive that can pronounce a situation as an emergency.
2. The implementation of the PCRDR Policy must be able to take proactive actions to prevent the deterioration of situations into emergencies/disasters.
3. PCRDR efforts must take cognisance of structural challenges so as to engender transformative interventions.
4. The humanitarian and emergency aspects of PCRDR should be responsive to the needs of communities in which they are implemented.
5. The linkage between the ECOSOCC and civil society is critical in PCRDR Policy implementation.
6. The success of a number of peace agreements is dependent on the ability to deliver humanitarian and emergency assistance to affected populations.
7. The geographical proximity of the AU to post-conflict countries on the continent provides it with the opportunity to also address the political stability in such countries.
8. The AU needs to engage more robustly through the provision of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in South Sudan, to save the existing Peace Agreement. The AU must also use its political leverage to address the political instability in the country.

Recommendations

1. It is imperative to educate members of the executive branches of government in Member States on the PCRDR Policy since in most instances, the Executive is the authorised arm to declare a situation as an emergency.
2. The AU PCRDR should engage systematically and more robustly with the ECOSOCC in order to utilise the opportunity provided to have access to a diverse number of CSOs.
3. Given its limited human and financial resources, the AU needs to identify a niche in the area of emergency and humanitarian assistance, so that its presence on the ground can deliver tangible results on, rather than undertaking general major and long-term assistance.
4. The AU should invest time in engaging at the field level to assess and understand local needs: enhancing the role of women and strengthening relations with CSOs will be important in determining appropriate responses.

CHAPTER VII

Political Governance and Transitions

Introduction

Building, developing and strengthening the institutions of states to facilitate political governance is essential for guiding countries through difficult situations and for state building and consolidation. This session's objective was to provide signposts on navigating the complexities of political governance in fragile and post-conflict countries.

Presentation and discussions

Suggestions were made that the AU should identify its core role as a facilitator, not an implementer so that it can focus on providing advisory services to Member States. Four major elements pertaining to political governance and transitions were discussed. First of all, in the post-conflict phase, there is a danger in rebuilding 'old' state structures that were in power during the conflict which could lead to cyclical instability and violence. Rebuilding trust is key to strengthening state-society relations because where there is no social trust, markets cannot function. Secondly, the AU must reflect on the interests and motivations of donors funding reconstruction efforts. Thirdly, in the context of limited resources, it could be necessary to go beyond the ASI initiative, for more comprehensive support. On this issue, it was suggested that the Peace Fund could provide funding for critical post-conflict economic reconstruction. Fourthly, given the broad nature of PCRDR programmes in post-conflict states, sequencing, prioritisation and coordination are essential but should be highly context-specific.

In view of the fact that post-conflict countries are highly susceptible to relapse, attention was drawn to the need to understand the complexities surrounding PCRDR. Highlighting the competing interests of PCRDR implementers, there was a call for the AU to be particularly mindful of the potential minefields of competition so as to avoid unintended consequences. Noting the high military expenditures in the face of limited resources for PCRDR, Member States were encouraged to invest more in the provision of socio-economic development of their countries. An analysis of the socio-economic transformation of post-conflict countries on the continent revealed three main trends; these were fairly successful countries that have succeeded in re-establishing the state such as Rwanda, Ethiopia and Uganda; states in the transition and stabilisation phase such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and the DRC and states trapped in cyclical conflict such as Somalia, South Sudan and Libya.

The existence of excellent mechanisms and frameworks for undertaking tasks related to political governance and transitions such as the Constitutive Act, the African Governance Architecture and the African Peace and Security Architecture (AGA-APSA), the Charter of Common Values and the agency of the ECOSOCC as a platform for rallying and engaging civil society organisations, was acknowledged. The challenge, it was noted, related to the failure of the mechanisms to work together. This makes it difficult to address PCRDR needs in a comprehensive and holistic manner. It was thus suggested that going forward, PCRDR engagements needed to bridge the AGA-APSA divide.

Drawing attention to the increasing militarisation of societies in Africa generally, and in the Sahel in particular, there were calls for the prosecution of crimes and the provision of justice to help restore the social fabric of these societies. To this end, the AU was encouraged to focus on developing the capacities of CSOs to help address the issue of corruption and advocate good governance and transparency in Member States. Given the diverse networks of CSOs on the continent, the AU and its RECs/RMs have the opportunity to engage them on a wide variety of issues, with a diverse audience that includes women, youth and children.

Addressing the issue of dangerous migration, there was an acknowledgement that the desperate efforts to cross the Mediterranean Sea despite its perils, was due largely in part to the challenges of bad governance and political instability on the continent. Although CSOs are at the forefront of addressing the challenge of dangerous migration, it was strongly recommended that the AU and its RECs/RMs should play a more proactive role to support the work being done by several CSOs by addressing the push factors of dangerous migration.

Strengthening political governance and facilitating enduring transitions is heavily dependent on building robust

institutions such as parliaments which play an important role in enacting appropriate laws for good governance, human rights institutions that advise on the options for the promotion and protection of rights. The institutions also exercise oversight over human rights protection, truth and reconciliation commissions that provide a platform for documenting atrocities committed during challenging situations in order to promote restorative justice as well as the rule of law and institutions that guarantee respect for the law, adjudication of the law, and interpretation of the law when needed. In addition to state entities, the value of non-state entities in promoting political governance and transitions was also highlighted. Citing examples from several post-conflict countries on the continent, it was highly recommended that the AU's PCRDR efforts should pay particular attention to building both state and non-state institutions that can facilitate transitions, enhance political governance and help deliver on the social contract.

Observations and Emerging Issues

1. The political leverage of the AU places it in a good position to facilitate transitions and support the establishment/strengthening of political governance.
2. Efforts at PCRDR risk recreating the old structures of state rather than transforming them.
3. Confidence building between citizens and the state is critical to ensuring stable transitions and sustainable political governance.
4. The ASI needs to provide comprehensive support for the reconstruction of affected states. It is imperative to explore the opportunities availed by the private sector in post-conflict reconstruction.
5. Socio-economic reconstruction is critical to the success of transitions. The Peace Fund should, therefore, provide funding for initial critical post-conflict economic reconstruction.
6. The competing interests of PCRDR implementers can be detrimental to the success of PCRDR in post-conflict countries.
7. The lack of cooperation between the various mechanisms hinders the ability to undertake comprehensive PCRDR.
8. Institution building is fundamental to establishing/enhancing political governance in post-conflict countries.
9. Re-establishing the rule of law to address impunity is essential for state building and political governance.
10. CSOs play a critical role in establishing and promoting political governance and should be engaged more robustly.
11. The AU's PCRDR engagements must be focused on results-based projects.

Recommendations

1. As part of its efforts, the AU, working with CSOs, needs to establish mechanisms and platforms to facilitate trust and confidence building between citizens and the state so as to gain the buy-in of the population on needed changes.
2. The AU needs to engage Member States in a systematic manner, through the ASI, to provide concrete and comprehensive support for affected countries. In addition, it is critical for the AU to explore pathways of engaging with the private sector to provide support towards political governance in post-conflict countries.
3. To minimise relapse into conflict, there should be a meaningful engagement that allows citizens to undertake socio-economic activities. The Peace Fund should, therefore, provide the initial funding required for the reconstruction of essential infrastructure required for socio-economic development such as feeder roads, bridges and markets that facilitate mobility and access to markets.
4. The AU must undertake capacity development for both formal and informal institutions that are relevant to the establishment and promotion of political governance in post-conflict countries; such as parliaments, the justice system, traditional authorities, CSOs and non-formal security institutions among others.
5. The AU's PCRDR efforts must be needs driven and results based. The AU should, therefore, develop a framework of engagement that encompasses needs identification, prioritisation and sequencing as well as monitoring and evaluation of interventions.

CHAPTER VIII

Socio-economic Reconstruction and Development

Introduction

The sustainability of PCRD is the ability of affected countries and people to be able to progressively pursue and sustain their socio-economic aspirations in an environment of peace and stability. This session discussed how the AU PCRD can assist post-conflict countries to facilitate conflict sensitive, sustainable and inclusive socio-economic reconstruction.

Presentations and discussions

Despite the steady growth recorded in a number of African countries, the continent is still caught in the throes of poverty and inequality, which undermines development. Noting that the model of development in Africa has generated unprecedented wealth, there was recognition that it has also created inequality. Moreover, although there was a decline in the number of armed conflicts, the continent has witnessed an upsurge that began in 2010. Most post-conflict countries find themselves in an economic quagmire that includes a slowdown in economic growth which exacerbates weakened governance and service delivery for the education, health and water sectors. The inability of the state to provide public goods has negative repercussions at social and community levels where the breakdown of social support systems results in inequity and especially gender inequalities, with the bulk of the population being left behind. A primary consideration for post-conflict socio-economic reconstruction and development, therefore, should be the socio-economic state of affairs prior to the outbreak of violence. This, it was agreed, is critical for determining the most effective socio-economic model for the post-conflict country.

Socio-economic reconstruction, it was noted, is beyond the provision of QIPs and PSPs. It includes developing short-, medium- and long-term, sound macroeconomic policies that are resilient to external and internal shocks. The AU must, therefore, accompany post-conflict countries, many of which lack or have limited human capital for the management of macroeconomic tools for crafting poverty reduction strategies, transitory budgetary frameworks among others.

In highlighting lessons drawn from the UN in implementing its policy for post-conflict employment creation, income generation and reintegration, several principles and processes were outlined. First is the recognition that in practice, implementation of such programmes follows three stages i.e. humanitarian assistance, recovery and development in a linear progression. However, in reality, implementation of the three phases can be done simultaneously to address consequences of conflict. Second is the great need to address the question of ownership. Third, interventions must be rapid, effective and coordinated. Fourth, implementing socio-economic and empowerment programmes requires a development of sustainability scenarios, whereby gains from interventions are expected to be preserved.

There was a reiteration of the great need for a strong focus on prevention; noting that conflicts cannot be alleviated without sustained attention to development. Learning from the lessons of the UN which have had positive experiences in restoring livelihoods through targeted, employment-generating interventions aimed at youth, it was recommended that to foster ownership, interventions must be targeted, rapid, effective and coordinated. Of particular importance was understanding the spoilers who benefit from conflict, as well as the regional dimensions of conflict. To this end, the AU was encouraged to understand the conflict actors, stakeholders and dynamics in every conflict and utilise the knowledge in crafting its interventions.

The AU's efforts at facilitating socio-economic reconstruction and development have included the establishment of health centres during the Ebola crisis in West Africa, facilitating food security and the creation of livelihoods in a number of post-conflict countries. A large majority of Africans work in the informal economy, a situation that is particularly true in most post-conflict countries. Thus, the AU was advised to consider providing assistance in formalising informal economies and assist with mobilising funds to aid the informal sector in post-conflict countries. Such efforts, it was suggested, should comprise a needs analysis, encouragement of public-private partnerships, encouraging corporate social responsibility of private corporations and the coordination of funding from various Partners. Added to the above, the AU was encouraged to facilitate the development of networks of researchers and research institutions to

undertake policy-oriented research for socio-economic development in post-conflict countries, document the AU's PCRDR experiences and disseminate information through various formats.

Attention was drawn to the intricate link between the socio-economic and development health of a country and the health of its people. Often overlooked in PCRDR processes, the psychosocial health of post-conflict populations is critical to the success of all PCRDR processes as conflicts are symptomatic of underlying individual and group issues and the experience of violence could create further traumas. Building effective states, it was noted, had to begin with building effective communities. Therefore, it was recommended that PCRDR efforts should engage in targeted community-building processes using the skills and competencies of local communities.

Concluding, there was a call for capacity development that equips Africans with the knowledge, tools and resources to meaningfully engage with duty bearers as well as external actors in negotiations relating to the exploitation of their countries' resources. This, it was stated, would ensure that Africans get the correct value for their natural resources to undertake their developmental needs. Promoting good governance and addressing corruption, it was stated, were fundamental to socio-economic reconstruction and development.

Observations and Emerging Issues

1. Early socio-economic reconstruction and development were critical to sustaining peace.
2. The state's ability to provide public goods and services in a post-conflict country enhances its legitimacy and contributes to confidence building in the state.
3. A chronological approach to PCRDR in which socio-economic development only comes after humanitarian assistance is not very helpful. Ensuring that people are able to get back as quickly as possible socio-economically is critical to the success of PCRDR generally.
4. Quick and targeted interventions that are effective, coordinated and provide equal opportunities for men, women and the youth to undertake socio-economic activities is critical to sustaining peace efforts in post-conflict countries.
5. Socio-economic reconstruction and development efforts must be conflict-sensitive in order to avoid unintended consequences and to prevent a relapse into conflict.
6. There is a need to broaden the AU's pool of resources for QIPs and PSPs to actively include the private sector as well as philanthropic organisations that are already engaged in humanitarian activities such as Rotary and Lions Clubs.
7. There is a need to facilitate the development of a pool of research institutions that are able to undertake policy-oriented research on models of socio-economic reconstruction for various post-conflict scenarios on the continent.
8. PCRDR efforts tend to ignore the psychosocial needs of affected communities and populations.
9. There is a need for the RECs and RMs to implement QIPs and PSPs to augment what the AU is able to provide.
10. Support for socio-economic reconstruction and development needs to be sustained in the medium-and long- term.
11. Addressing corruption and facilitating processes to enhance good governance were fundamental to sustaining socio-economic development.

Recommendations

1. One of the primary ways of promoting socio-economic reconstruction and development is through the development of relevant policy and legal frameworks. To this end, post-conflict countries that are not parties to international, continental and regional frameworks that promote socio-economic development, should be encouraged to sign on to those treaties. In addition, post-conflict countries should be supported to domesticate such frameworks to ensure that there are national frameworks to guide socio-economic reconstruction efforts.
2. In addition to the ASI, the AU should establish a platform for engaging the private sector as well as international service organisations such as the Rotary and Lions Clubs that are already engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance so as to enlarge the AU's pool of resources for socio-economic reconstruction and development.

3. Socio-economic reconstruction and development must be underpinned by empirically generated research. The AU, with its convening power, should develop a network of research institutions capable of providing policy-oriented research to support the whole PCRD effort of the AU and especially, to assist in the development of relevant socio-economic development models for post-conflict countries on the continent.
4. Although some RECs/RMs provide QIPs and PSPs, this is not across the board. Since most RECs/RMs are the first responders to crisis in their regions, the AU should engage with the RECs/RMs in the implementation of QIPs and PSPs with a view to increasing their efforts in facilitating regional PCRD efforts.
5. Support for PCRD processes must be for the short-, medium- and long- term. This requires the AU to provide, based on the identified needs of the countries involved, technical experts who can assist with the development of national capacities for institutional transformation, and the development of sound macroeconomic policies among others. It also requires coordination with other actors such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank, the mobilisation of requisite resources for scholarships, the procurement of relevant softwares etc. to enhance accountability, transparency and the development of sound macroeconomic and fiscal policies.
6. Using its political leverage, the AU must also work with relevant stakeholders to assist post-conflict countries put in place relevant instruments for promoting good governance, fight corruption and promote transparency and accountability in all sectors of socio-economic development.

“
The AU’s efforts at facilitating socio-economic reconstruction and development have included the establishment of health centres during the Ebola crisis in West Africa, facilitating food security and the creation of livelihoods in a number of post-conflict countries.
”



CHAPTER IX

Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation

Introduction

One of the primary reasons for violent conflict is the absence of frameworks and mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law a situation that gets exacerbated in crisis situations. Promoting and protecting human rights as well as eliciting accountability for human rights violations are therefore essential to the consolidation of peace in post-conflict countries. Yet, this could also yield unintended consequences, exacerbate differences and deepen divides. The objective of this session was to provide lessons from post-conflict countries that have successfully undertaken transitional justice and have put in place mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law.

Presentations and discussions

The fundamental issue raised in this session was the fact that there is no one size that fits all approaches to addressing issues of human rights violations in post-conflict countries. What was important was ensuring that impunity is not left unacknowledged and unpunished. However, the format of acknowledgement, restoration and punishment were issues that required careful consideration on a case-by-case basis. It was noted that even though human rights, transitional justice and reconciliation are linked, each has complex characteristics and as a result, in some instances, imperfect solutions prevail. Yet, it is impractical to consider one without consideration for others. Thus, while there is no denying that the erosion of human rights, rule of law and the abrogation of rights are all sources of conflicts, understanding the root causes of impunity in any given context is critical to the design of an appropriate mechanism for exacting justice and promoting reconciliation.

Using the example of Mato Oput (drinking the bitter herb), the transitional justice mechanism employed in Northern Uganda to address the twenty-year civil war with the Lord's Resistance Army rebels, attention was drawn to the fact that in intractable conflicts, the best option may be to pursue restorative rather than retributive justice. This type of restorative justice is neither a denial of the atrocities committed nor a failure to punish. Rather, it is a process that seeks to restore relations between communities, where murder (accidental or intentional) took place by encouraging perpetrators to accept responsibility for their actions, express remorse and make a token payment of compensation to show repentance. This transitional justice mechanism is anchored by vigorous truth telling, with the ultimate goal being a restoration of relationships, healing and the promotion of co-existence.

The experience of Ivory Coast in addressing the human rights atrocities that characterised the post-election crisis of 2012 also provided options for consideration in efforts to promote human rights, justice and reconciliation. Ivory Coast adopted a parallel process that provided for restorative and retributive justice. Following the end of the crisis, a Dialogue—Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created to examine the root causes of the conflict. At the same time, there was a judicial process ongoing in The Hague to try former President Gbagbo for his alleged role in the atrocities that were committed during the crisis. Critical lessons learned from the Ivorian process were the need for inclusiveness to safeguard the neutrality of the process. The inclusion of an individual who had campaigned for an opposition candidate undermined the impartiality of the Commission and led to accusations of bias. Similarly, the failure to include CSOs in the composition of the Commission led to demonstrations. Thus, even before it begun its work, the legitimacy of the Commission was questioned.

Its challenging start notwithstanding, the Ivorian experience also provides useful lessons for transitional justice on the continent. The creation of local committees, which provided an opportunity for youth, women, settler communities in Ivory Coast and religious representatives to be represented, was useful in promoting inclusivity in the process. Although traditional authorities decried their exclusion in the processes, provisions in the new constitution cement their role. Drawing lessons from the Ivorian experience, a number of issues that need consideration were raised: first is whether post-conflict countries need to have a linear approach to development and justice where development should be prioritised over justice or whether there can be a simultaneous process of development and justice operating

side by side. The second issue was the nature in which the transitional justice mechanism was adopted. In this regard, it was suggested that the nature and dynamics of the conflict should be taken into consideration when deciding on a transitional justice option. Third, was the issue of timing, in instances where some protagonists remained powerful actors within the state system, attention has to be paid to the timing of transitional justice processes to limit the leverage of spoilers. Fourthly, while every country would have to decide on the best possible transitional justice mechanism, it was recommended that serious attention must be paid to the use of more than one mechanism to ensure that a perception of ‘victor’s justice’ is not created within the country.

Highlights of the AU’s efforts at providing guidance for transitional justice and reconciliation revealed that an AU Transitional Justice Policy was in the offing. Once completed, the policy would provide guidance on considerations for transitional justice on the continent. A critical point raised in relation to the efforts of the AU was the need to “learn while doing” so that the crafting of the policy can benefit from the various experiences of transitional justice in various parts of the continent. Critically, there is a direct link between transitional justice and human rights as articulated in the AU PCRD Policy whereby the triple objectives of peace, reconciliation and justice are mutually desirable. Yet, while it is possible to get the process and substance right, the will to compromise and enforce are crucial. The AU is expected to play a critical role in this regard even though currently, there is no enforcement or monitoring mechanism.

Observations and Emerging Issues

1. Given that transitional justice is not widely accepted, there is the need to build awareness on its merits, which are grounded in the pursuit of justice, protection of human rights of all and equality before the law.
2. The sequencing of justice and peace presents options for choices in prioritisation but should not exclude one in favour of another. The pursuit of peace and justice in one situation or context is thus mutually reinforcing.
3. Traditional African mechanisms on transitional justice can be drawn upon and institutionalised at the national, regional and continental level.
4. CSOs play critical roles in the promotion of justice and transitional justice processes.
5. In the evolving reconciliation practice, jihadist groups are now participating in peace negotiations. With such a sensitive development, there is the need to bring CSOs and communities to the same level of understanding as governments.
6. The involvement of state agencies in committing human rights atrocities needs to be further interrogated.

Recommendations

1. Peace, justice and reconciliation should ordinarily be pursued simultaneously as they are interlinked. However, if there is a need for sequencing and prioritisation, it must be context specific.
2. The AU should draw on African experiences with reconciliation and transitional justice and how can it harnesses lessons from traditional approaches such as the Mato Oput in northern Uganda that addresses the harms of victims and holds perpetrators accountable. Lessons should also be drawn from the experience of Ivory Coast where parallel processes of a Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a criminal justice process against authors and perpetrators of serious human rights violations, including the trial of the former president at the Hague, provided a balance between the promotion of restorative justice for victims and prosecution of perpetrators of serious human rights crimes in the country.
3. In developing its Transitional Justice Policy as a guidance on considerations for transitional justice on the continent, the AU needs to learn from the various experiences of transitional justice in various parts of the continent.
4. The AU and RECs should play a leading role in cultivating political will in Member States to integrate transitional justice mechanisms in their respective judicial systems.

CHAPTER X

Women, Gender and Youth

Introduction



Ms. Bineta Diop, Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security with Dr. Sarjoh Bah, Head, CMPCRD

Women and youth are often presented in very categorical terms in conflict and post-conflict contexts. While women are, on the one hand, represented as vulnerable and victims, youth are usually, on the other hand, presented as protagonists and spoilers. Given the heterogeneity of each group, neither classification is an entirely true representation. This session aimed to draw lessons on how to harness the agency of women, youth and other marginalised groups in post-conflict reconstruction and development processes.

On Women and Gender

Citing Aspiration 6 of Agenda 2063 and the concrete examples of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on the continent, there was an emphasis that development is people-driven, and needs to unleash the potential of all, including women and youth. The challenge, it was noted, was the lack of implementation of the goal. It was advocated that the AU could play a role in supporting local conflict resolution initiatives and that for gender-mainstreaming to be realised,

there needs to be a critical mass of women in peacekeeping, mediation, observation and monitoring. The AU needs to be present in all the stages of conflict management to build on the gains made in the women, peace and security practice. Out-moded ways of thinking will prevent women from contributing to peacebuilding. To enhance the gains made, it was suggested that moving forward, synergising and coordinating efforts with clear focus on grassroots reconciliation processes with PCRDR should be a priority.

It was noted that while there have been improvements in the inclusion of women in peace processes, and a consensus to include women as actors, progress has been much slower than expected. Gender inequality is still prominent in post-conflict countries, even though this period presents an opportunity to change relations. Unfortunately, while gender equality is a marker for prosperity in a country, there is no concomitant investment in seeing UN Security Council Resolution 1325 become a reality. There were calls for an objective and critical analysis to ascertain Africa's progress and non-progress in implementing gender, peace and security frameworks since a lot more still needs to be done at institutional and community level. To facilitate gender mainstreaming, the AU was called upon to play a coordinating role, to ensure that 15% of national budgets goes to gender mainstreaming. The meeting acknowledged that there are improvements in the inclusion of women in peace processes. The post-conflict environment provides an ideal opportunity to change existing gender relations.

In acknowledging that PCRDR is a political process, there was consensus on the need to explore how the redistribution of power and resources can be undertaken within the context of the state as we know it which is underpinned by both neoliberal policies and structures that date back to the 1960s' to meet the needs of a post-conflict country or one going through transition. In a post-conflict setting, it is important to address the following key questions: who will benefit from post-conflict reconstruction efforts? Who will decide on the process and its form? How do we conceive of the state and security differently? What concrete measures need to be taken to avoid a relapse? Despite the seeming lack of consensus on the need to address the critical questions raised above, it was agreed that the welfare of citizens should be at the centre of all peacebuilding endeavours. Hence, women do not have to justify to being included in peace and post-conflict development processes.

Consequently, peacebuilding should be gender sensitive and as such should focus on rebuilding the social fabric of communities such as access to health and education facilities and safety, which are often the priorities for women. In terms of strengthening peace support operations, the meeting reiterated the need to interrogate the role and impact of the Gender Units in addressing gender concerns in conflict prevention and management. It is also critical to question whether training alone makes peacekeepers and host countries more gender sensitive. It was concluded that addressing the issue of gender in a post-conflict setting requires a radical change in power relations so as to ensure that women's interests are reflected in the new social contract that is developed in the post-conflict phase.

On the issue of local ownership, it was emphasised that external interventions, if not managed properly, could be problematic and would not produce the desired results. So, while the role of external actors may be justified in particular situations, when such actors take over the role and functioning of the state, the likelihood of a relapse is increased. Thus, finding the balance between external and national actors, and the gradual development of the space for national actors to take over their responsibilities, is one of the critical processes on post-conflict and reconstruction engagements. Defining clear roles and responsibilities with benchmarks and timelines for the exit of international actors including international civil society organisations should be at the centre of all peacebuilding engagements. This is critical to avoid a situation of perpetual 'babysitting' or leaving prematurely, both of which could have disastrous consequences for peace consolidation efforts.

The session concluded by noting that peacemaking and peacebuilding is still male dominated. Emphasis was also placed on the need to ensure that leadership at all levels is accountable to its citizenry, a change in the mindset and behaviour through behaviour education (and not training) as essential ingredients for effective peacebuilding.

Observations and Emerging Issues

1. Despite progress in empowering women through the adoption of various national, regional and international instruments, progress is still hampered by structural challenges such as cultural norms and practices.
2. For peacebuilding to be sustainable it should be people-centred, hence, the need to view security from the standpoint of human security and not the narrow state-centric prism which privileges regime security over the welfare of citizens.
3. Peacebuilding should be anchored on education and not training; critical thinking should guide and help to define a new social contract that includes gender equality.

Recommendations

1. PCRD efforts must be conflict as well as gender sensitive so as to minimise unintended consequences and prevent an exacerbation of fault lines. In this context, the AU should play a coordinating role to implement gender mainstreaming in post-conflict societies. Towards this end, there is a need for greater synergy between the Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security; the Directorate on Women, Gender and Development; and the Gender, Peace and Security Programme.
2. Critical thinking should guide and help to define a new social contract that includes gender equality. This can be effectively done through the adoption of progressive education policies and curricula.
3. Men should play central roles in efforts to address continuing discrimination against women including gender-based violence through the adoption of zero-tolerance policies. Such a paradigm shift would go a long way in ensuring compliance with national, regional and international norms and instruments on gender mainstreaming.

“Peacebuilding should be gender sensitive and as such should focus on rebuilding the social fabric of communities such as access to health and education facilities and safety, which are often the priorities for women.”

On Youth

The discussion on the empowerment of youth was centred on the how to ensure implementation of policies, declarations and other instruments. Lack of implementation was identified as a major challenge that continues to hinder progress in this area. For instance, the Youth Division of the AUC has a huge mandate but lacks the financial and human resources to deliver. To date, the Youth Division has undertaken some key activities most notably, ‘the inter-generational dialogue’, the African Youth Volunteer Core programme as well as engagements with vocational centres to support unskilled youth. The role of youths in decision-making processes was identified as an important area where the AU could play an important role in forging links between youth and decision-makers and encourage Member States to create the space for youth to play a role in the day-to-day operations of governments. This can only be achieved if governments adopt youth-friendly policies and more critically, dedicate the necessary resources – financial and human – to implement them.

It was argued that such policies should exclude a reframing of youths as ‘spoilors’, to seeing youth as an untapped reservoir of skills that should be harnessed for the greater good. Such a reframing would ensure that youth play a central role in the realisation of the aspirations of Agenda 2063. At the community level, they can play a crucial role peacebuilding efforts especially if they are actively involved in decision-making efforts in designing and implementing developments projects at that level. Special programmes and policies should be designed to respond to the needs of uneducated and unskilled youths who often constitute the vast majority of this section of society.

Observations and Emerging Issues

1. The absence of opportunities for youth in many countries threatens peacebuilding efforts thereby increasing the likelihood of relapse.
2. The issue of youth empowerment is multilayered, it straddles the generational, educational and gender divides in society.
3. While religion may be a factor in the radicalisation of youths, marginalisation and exclusion, poverty and loss of dignity are factors that need to be addressed as well.

Recommendations

1. The AU should work with Member States to ensure the participation of youth in decision-making and the implementation of youth-friendly policies and programmes. Special emphasis should be placed on the needs of uneducated and unskilled youth who are often neglected in the design of peacebuilding interventions.
2. The AU should support the generation of research to develop evidence-based data on the contribution of youth in PCRD. This would contribute to the development of targeted policies with clear guidelines for implementation.
3. The AU should harness the skills of youth for the realisation of Agenda 2063. In this regard, an ‘AU Youth Ambassadors’ programme could be established to advance the voices of youth in the context of Agenda 2063.

“
Special programmes and policies should be designed to respond to the needs of uneducated and unskilled youths who often constitute the vast majority of this section of society.
”

CHAPTER XI

Partnerships

Introduction

The session on partnerships sought to provide partners with an opportunity to share the specific contributions they would want to make to further develop and enhance the implementation of the PCRD Policy, as well as to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the AUC and partners including International Organisations, multilateral Donors, CSOs, private sector, media and the academia in peacebuilding efforts.

Presentations and discussions

From the outset, the meeting noted the imperative for a well-managed and coordinated partnership in peacebuilding interventions. Predictable and well-calibrated partnerships on issues of security sector reform, demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration and reinsertion, transitional justice among others, were identified as crucial factors in sustaining peace and avoiding relapse. Special emphasis was placed on the need to reflect on the role of RECs as pillars and building blocks of the AU not as partners in the traditional sense of the word. Consequently, the AU's relations with the RECs and by extension other partners requires a well-thought out strategy and funds to support the implementation of PCRD activities in a coordinated manner. The meeting deliberated on the issue of sequencing especially as it relates to the transitional justice programmes and the need to develop, where necessary, joint monitoring and follow up mechanisms with clear milestones in the implementation of peace agreements. ECOWAS' engagement in Guinea-Bissau was cited as an example of where the REC developed a post-conflict strategy in a participatory manner. The strategy focuses on strengthening key sectors of the Government in the following areas; constitutionalism, judiciary, public sector and electoral governance. How implementation of this strategy is coordinated with other international partners including the AU would determine its success. Avoiding a one size fits all approach and appreciating the fact that each region or post-conflict situation comes with its own peculiarities, should guide the formulation and nuancing of regional and international intervention strategies. In this vein, special efforts should be given to understanding why some countries are more susceptible to relapse than others.

Identifying the comparative advantages of the various actors involved in peacebuilding efforts, and developing a 'division of labour' of sorts is critical to ensuring coherence in the delivery of post-conflict assistance. For instance, the strengths of AU and AfDB are in the political and economic spheres, respectively. How these strengths are leveraged would determine the success of both actors in a post-conflict setting. While the AfDB can disengage from a given country due to elevated security concerns, as was the case in South Sudan and Burundi, the AU does not have that option; it gets even more involved as the political and security crisis deepens. The meeting, therefore, reflected on whether the AfDB and the AU can work out a security agreement that would enhance complementarity between the two institutions. The role of the AU and AfDB in supporting the countries affected by the Ebola Epidemic Virus was cited as one instance where the comparative strengths of the two entities were harnessed in an effective manner. The deliberations concluded with calls for greater collaboration between the AU, AfDB, RECs, civil society, the academia and private sector to address the post-conflict challenges facing the continent.

The use of experts who live in the shadows of a conflict as opposed to the use of external experts was identified as one practical way of ensuring ownership of peacebuilding efforts. Sustaining peace requires nurturing processes that are inclusive, locally-led and not necessarily importing expertise from outside the country. However, there was an emphasis on the added value of peer-to-peer experience sharing. The issue of accountability between and among partners and the role of rising powers and approach to peacebuilding requires serious interrogation. Civil society was identified as a crucial actor and change agent that could contribute to creating incentives for good leadership at the macro-, and micro-levels of society.

Observations and Emerging Issues

1. The PCRD Policy should be the point of reference of any post-conflict reconstruction efforts on the continent.
2. Managing the interface between national, regional and international actors remains a challenge.
3. Marrying of competencies and comparative advantages including questions of legitimacy and the management of limited resources for peacebuilding remains a challenge.
4. Knowledge management across organisations still remains a big challenge.

Recommendations

1. The AU, in collaboration with the RECs, should develop common Standard Operating Procedures for their collaboration on PCRD.
2. The AU and its partners should develop and elaborate a clear division of labour based on their competencies and comparative advantages in order to maximise their contributions on PCRD in post-conflict African countries.
3. National, regional and international actors in peacebuilding should avoid talent-substitution and use local expertise to ensure ownership.
4. Peacebuilding partnerships should cover full conflict-spectrum so to avoid relapse.
5. The AU should ensure that emerging paradigms and actors in peacebuilding are reflected in its partnerships and interventions.

“ Identifying the comparative advantages of the various actors involved in peacebuilding efforts, and developing a ‘division of labour’ of sorts is critical to ensuring coherence in the delivery of post-conflict assistance. ”

CHAPTER XII

Conclusion

As noted during all sessions of the workshop, the implementation of the AU PCRD Policy has grown since its adoption in 2006. However, its implementation requires a reflection on its effectiveness, relevance and impact on attaining the goals of ‘Silencing the Guns by 2020’ and Agenda 2063. Over the last ten years, there has been an increasing visibility of the AU’s peacebuilding reach through its Liaison Offices in countries emerging from conflict. As the AU reflects on ten years of implementation of its PCRD Policy, there is need to shift from the current top-down, state-centric approach to a more people-centred paradigm with a specific focus on peace dividends, especially for women and youth. Achieving a required equilibrium between security, peacebuilding and long-term development remains a major challenge. As the AU works towards consolidating its PCRD Policy, there is an urgent need for funding for medium-, and long-term peacebuilding initiatives on the continent.

The following key themes emerged as common threads that need to be considered in all planning processes by all stakeholders at the national, regional and continental level.

1. **Conceptual clarity:** There is a need for all stakeholders to understand what PCRD is by raising awareness so that both the African elite and communities have a shared understanding.
2. **The primacy of politics:** It is critical to take into account the transformative nature or approach of the reconstruction and the fact that PCRD is a political process. There is a need to question how the redistribution of power and resources can be undertaken within the context of a post-conflict setting to ensure that an inclusive social contract is developed.
3. **Niche role of the AU in PCRD:** The AU’s role should focus on supporting national authorities to formulate the right policies and strategies to consolidate peace in their countries. Among other things, this could be done by facilitating peer-to-peer knowledge sharing.
4. **Managing partnerships:** The AU should play a more assertive role in negotiating with international partners with a view to developing optimal partnerships underpinned by the principle of comparative strength in peacebuilding endeavours.
5. **Coherence and coordination:** The AU should work towards ensuring that there is a shared understanding of PCRD across the AUC, between the PSC and the AUC, between the AUC and RECs/RMs, and within Africa broadly, including within the Members States and civil society. Understanding PCRD as a solidarity-based African peer-to-peer knowledge exchange and political accompaniment process in order to sustain peace will assist greatly in the unity of effort among the broad range of actors involved in peacebuilding.
6. **Inclusivity:** The AU’s peacebuilding interventions should be inclusive and guided by the human security paradigm.
7. **Key role of youth:** Encourage participation of young people in decision-making and implementation and facilitate interactions between youth and leaders.
8. **Prevention:** Most of the Panelists and participants emphasised the need to put more energy and resources into preventive action to ensure that conflicts do not erupt in the first place.
9. **Leverage public-private partnerships and corporate social responsibility:** With a view of prioritising agency and quality leadership in the AU peacebuilding and PCRD architecture, the ECOSOCC should put forward proposals to provide space for CSOs and the private sector to engage and mobilise the communities who remain an important resource in PCRD Policy implementation. Within the ECOSOCC framework, the AU should build the capacity of CSOs that can play a bigger role in pressuring states to promote transparency and good governance.
10. **National and local ownership:** While the role of external actors may be justified in particular situations when such actors take over the role and functioning of the state, there is a likelihood of a relapse. There is a strong imperative to ensure local ownership but one that is truly representative of the interest of the broader society.
11. **Leadership:** PCRD interventions should be geared towards developing and reinforcing leadership at the national


and local levels. This process must be underpinned by mutual accountability.

12. **Timeliness of PCRD Interventions:** There is a need to rethink PCRD implementation in situations of ongoing conflict, where without these interventions, relapses could happen. An approach to PSOs wouldn't need to be militaristic, but rather should aim to integrate peacebuilding and PCRD thinking into the AU's analysis and planning, ensuring that there is a move away from a chronological approach PCRD. It is vital to ensure that work of the AU offices and missions, including military actions, are directed by a politically grounded strategy. In integrating peacebuilding and PCRD, there exists a window for creating opportunities of non-coercive strategies.
13. **Predictable funding:** In order to ensure that there is predictable funding for PCRD initiatives and, therefore consistent engagement from the AU on peacebuilding processes, the AU Peace Fund should include specific funding for PCRD activities in Window 1 (Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation) and Window 3 (Peace Support Operations).
14. **A holistic approach to peacebuilding:** The AUC needs to further institutionalise the inter-departmental task force structure, and the task force should work closely with the PSC Sub-Committee on PCRD in Africa. The AUC should, under the political guidance of the PSC, adopt an AU-wide holistic system- approach to peacebuilding. For meaningful socio-economic transformation, there is the need to realise that PCRD is not just a technical and resource-based endeavour, but it is the capacity of the state to do what its citizens are asking.
15. **Lessons learned/sharing forums:** There is a need for regular knowledge and strategic planning exchanges between the AUC, the AfDB and the Economic Commission for Africa which will enhance the knowledge on peacebuilding in Africa and ensure that they share analyses and needs assessments of countries at risk.



TEN YEARS OF AU POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Programme



Time	Description of activity	Responsible focal point
08.30-09.45	Registration of Participants	Peace and Security Department
Session I: Welcome and Opening Ceremony		
Moderator: Dr. Admore Kambudzi, Director, Peace and Security Department		
Coffee / Tea Break		
10.00-10.15	Welcome Address	HE Ambassador Smail Chergui Commissioner for Peace and Security African Union Commission (AUC)
10.15-10.30	Role of the Peace and Security Council in the implementation of the AU PCRD Policy	HE Ambassador Catherine Muigai Mwangi , Chair of the AU Peace and Security Council for the Month of October 2016
10.30-10.45	Group Photo	
Session II: Overview of the African Union PCRD Policy and Africa's Emerging Peacebuilding Architecture		
<i>This session provides a trajectory of the AU's PCRD efforts since its establishment to the present. It chronicles the efforts made, the challenges faced and the prospects for the future. The objective of this session is to elicit suggestions and recommendations on how the efforts of the PCRD could be better enhanced to meet the actual needs of post-conflict countries on the continent.</i>		
Moderator: Mrs Edith Grace Sempala, Member of Secretary-General's Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture		
10.45-11.30	Panel 1 AU PCRD Policy Implementation: Progress, Challenges and Prospects	Panelist Dr. Sarjoh Bah - Head, Crisis Management, Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, PSD
11:30-13.00	Moderator: Amb. Zaina Nyiramata - Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC) and Head of African Union Liaison Office (AULO) in Chad Panel 2 The role of AULOs in supporting the implementation of AU PCRD Policy (activities), challenges involved and recommendations on how to support AULOs to effectively implement the PCRD Policy	Panelists Amb. Abdou Abarry – SRCC and Head of AULO in the Democratic Republic of Congo Brigadier General Sara Thomas Rwambali - SRCC and Head of AULO in South Sudan Prof. Mohamed El Hacem Lebatt – SRCC and Head of AULO in the Central African Republic Prof. Ibrahima Fall – SRCC and Head of AULO in Burundi
13.00-14.00	Lunch	
Session III: From Stabilisation to Peacebuilding: The Dynamics of Managing Transitions from Stabilisation to Long-term Peacebuilding		
<i>This session will reflect on the broad dynamics of managing transitions from initial stabilisation which often has a heavy military footprint to long-term peacebuilding with a focus on reconstruction, revitalisation of public service institutions, and short- to medium-term socio-economic and political development. Among other things, the panelists will address the challenges and opportunities of 'winning hearts and minds' of the local civilian population and the critical shortage of human and financial resources to tackle the immediate needs of communities in areas under the control of a peace support operation. In this vein, they will reflect on the pivotal role of Quick Impact and Peace Strengthening Projects in a counter-insurgency environment.</i>		
Moderator: Col Cheikh F. Mady Dembele, Senior Officer on Conflict Management and Strategic Planning, Crisis Management, Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, PSD		

Time	Description of activity	Responsible focal point
14.00-15.00	<p>Panel 3</p> <p>Reflection on managing transitions from initial stabilisation to long-term peacebuilding</p>	<p>Panelists</p> <p>Amb. Francisco Caetano Madeira - SRCC, AMISOM</p> <p>Dr. Cedric de Coning – Research Fellow, ACCORD/NUPI</p> <p>Dr. Vasu Gounden – Founder and Executive Director, ACCORD</p>
15.00-15.30	Coffee / Tea Break	
<p>Session IV: Security: Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Reinsertion, and Security Sector Reform</p> <p>A critical pre-requisite for post-conflict reconstruction is security. Freedom from fear and want are fundamental to building the confidence and trust required for all the processes of peacebuilding, reconstruction and state consolidation. This session provides an overview of assistance provided by the UN and the AU to post-conflict states in enhancing security. The objective is to encourage recommendations on how the AU can assist post-conflict countries in a timely, structured and systematic way to facilitate freedom from fear and want.</p> <p>Moderator: Ambassador Pequeno Ovidio Pequeno - Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of African Union Liaison Office in Guinea-Bissau</p>		
15:30-16:30	<p>Panel 4</p> <p>An overview of assistance provided by the UN and the AU to post-conflict states in enhancing security</p>	<p>Panelists</p> <p>Mr. Hamouda Kanu - Senior SSR Expert, Defence and Security Division, PSD</p> <p>Dr. Martin Rupiya – Associate Professor for Institute of African Renaissance Studies, UNISA & Executive Director, The African Public Policy & Research Institute</p> <p>Brigadier Gen. (Rtd) Riana Paneras – Former Commissioner of Police, African Union – UN Mission in Darfur</p>
<p>Session V: Humanitarian /Emergency Assistance</p> <p>Most of the populations in crisis are often vulnerable and require emergency assistance and relief. The objective of this session is to identify the structures and mechanisms in place for PCRD to be a better interface with the institutions engaged in the provision of humanitarian/emergency assistance for the timely provision of such assistance in countries in crises.</p> <p>Moderator: Mr Moses Chrispus Okello, Conflict Analyst, Early Warning and Response Mechanism, IGAD</p>		
16:30-17:30	<p>Panel 5</p> <p>Identify the structures and mechanisms in place for PCRD to be able to better interface with the institutions engaged in the provision of humanitarian/emergency assistance</p>	<p>Panelists</p> <p>Dr. Joseph Chilengi - Presiding Officer, ECOSOCC</p> <p>Ms. Betty Sunday Ben – Coordinator, Women Monthly Forum for Peace Process, South Sudan</p>
17:30-17.35	Summary and Take Aways	

Thursday 20 October Friday 2016

Time	Description of activity	Responsible focal point
<p>Session VI: Political Governance and Transitions, Constitutionalism and Rule of Law</p> <p>Building, developing and strengthening the institutions of states to facilitate political governance, is essential for guiding states through difficult situations and for state building and consolidation. This session is to provide signposts on navigating the complexities of political governance in fragile and post-conflict countries.</p> <p>Moderator: Dr George Mukundi, Head, African Governance Architecture Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs</p>		

Time	Description of activity	Responsible focal point
09:00-10:00	<p>Panel 6</p> <p>Provide signposts on navigating the complexities of political governance and in fragile and post-conflict countries in Africa</p>	<p>Panelists</p> <p>Professor Said Adejumobi – Director, Subregional Office in Southern Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</p> <p>Amb. B. Diarra – Former Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission, African Union Mission in Somalia</p>
10:00-10:30	Coffee / Tea Break	
<p>Session VII: Socio-economic Reconstruction and Development</p> <p>The sustainability of PCRDR is the ability of affected countries and people to be able to progressively pursue and sustain their socio-economic aspirations in an environment of peace and stability. This session discusses how the AU can assist post-conflict countries to facilitate conflict sensitive, sustainable and inclusive socio-economic reconstruction.</p> <p>Moderator: Mr Patrick Ndzana Olomo, Policy Expert, Investment & Resource Mobilisation, Dep. of Economic Affairs, AUC</p>		
10:30-11:45	<p>Panel 7</p> <p>Consolidate conflict sensitive, sustainable and inclusive socio-economic reconstruction</p>	<p>Panelists</p> <p>Mr. Oumar Diop - Department of Social Affairs, AUC</p> <p>Amb. Lazarous Kapambwe –Advisor, Economic Affairs, Office of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission</p> <p>Mr. George Okutho – Director, ILO Country Office for Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan and Special Representative to the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</p>
<p>Session VIII: Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation</p> <p>One of the primary reasons for violent conflict is the absence of frameworks and mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law; situations that tend to get exacerbated in crisis situations. Promoting and protecting human rights as well as eliciting accountability for human rights violations are therefore essential to the consolidation of peace in post-conflict countries. Yet this could also yield unintended consequences, exacerbate differences and deepen divides. The objective of this session, therefore, is to provide lessons from post-conflict countries that have successfully undertaken transitional justice and have put in place mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law.</p> <p>Moderator: Dr. Sunday Okello – Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University</p>		
11:45-13:00	<p>Panel 8</p> <p>Consolidate lessons from post-conflict countries that have successfully undertaken transitional justice and have put in place mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law</p>	<p>Panelists</p> <p>Bishop Macleod Baker Ochola II – Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative</p> <p>Mrs. Yabah Berthe Karbo - Chief of Staff, Office of the President of the Commission of National Reconciliation and Compensation of Victims</p> <p>Dr. George Mukundi Head, African Governance Architecture Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs</p>
13:00-14:00	Lunch Break	
<p>Session IX: Women and Youth</p> <p>Women and youth are often presented in very categorical terms in conflict and post-conflict contexts. While women are on the one hand represented as vulnerable and victims, youth are usually presented as protagonists and spoilers. Given the heterogeneity of each group, neither classification is an entirely true representation. This session aims to draw lessons on how to harness the agency of women, youth and other marginalised groups in post-conflict reconstruction and development processes.</p> <p>Moderator: Amb. Hawa Ahmed Youssouf - Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of African Union Liaison Office in Madagascar</p>		

Time	Description of activity	Responsible focal point
14:00-15:00	Panel 9 Harness the agency of women, youth and other marginalised groups in post-conflict reconstruction and development processes	Panelists Ms. Bineta Diop - Special Envoy of the Chairperson on Women, Peace and Security Professor Cheryl Hendricks - University of Johannesburg Ms. Prudence Ngwenya Nonkululeko - Head of Human Resources & Youth Development Division, Human Resources, Science & Technology Department, AUC Mr. Prince Ifor - President, Young African Leaders Forum, South Africa
15:00-15:45	Discussions	
15:45-16:00	Coffee / Tea Break	
16:00-17:00	Summary and Takeaways	

Friday 21 October Friday 2016

Time	Description of activity	Responsible focal point
<p>Session X: Partnerships: United Nations, Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms, African Development Bank, World Bank and Civil Society Organisations</p> <p>The session seeks to provide partners with an opportunity to share the specific contributions they would want to make to further develop and enhance the implementation of the PCRD policy, as well as to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the AUC and partners among International Organisations, Multilateral Donors, Civil Society Organisations, media and the academia.</p> <p>Moderator: Dr. Tony Karbo - Director of the Karamoja Cluster Project, a UPEACE Africa Programme</p>		
09:00-10:30	Panel 10 Further develop partnerships to enhance the implementation of the PCRD Policy, as well as to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the AUC	Panelists: Dr. Stefano Failla – United Nations Office to the AU Dr. Yero Baldeh – African Development Bank Ms. Raheemat O. Momodu – Head, ECOWAS Liaison Office to the AU Dr.Theodore Njikam - Head, ECCAS Liaison Office to the AU Prof. Chuck Call - Director, International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program, School of International Service, American University
10:30-11:00	Coffee / Tea Break	
<p>Session XI: Next Steps and Way Forward</p> <p>Moderator: Dr Sarjoh Bah - Head, Crisis Management, Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, PSD</p>		
11:00-12:15	Panel 11 Summary of Discussions Wrap-up and Next Steps	Panelists: Dr. George Mukundi, Head, African Governance Architecture Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs Amb. B. Diarra – Former Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission, African Union Mission in Somalia
12:15-12:30	Closing Session	Dr. Admore Kambudzi – Director, Peace and Security Department, AUC

Table 1: List of participants

S/N	Name	Position	Organisation
1	Amb. Smail Chergui	Commissioner for Peace and Security	African Union Commission (AUC)
2	Dr. Admore Kambudzi	Ag. Director, Peace and Security Department	AUC
3	Ms. Bineta Diop	Special Envoy of the Chairperson on Women, Peace and Security	AUC
4	Mrs. Mahawa Kaba Wheeler	Director, Women, Gender and Development Directorate	AUC
5	Ms. Victoria Maloka	Head, Advocacy and Outreach Division, Women, Gender & Development Directorate	AUC
6	Amb. B. Diarra	Former Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission, African Union Mission in Somalia	
7	Amb. Lazarous Kapambwe	Advisor, Economic Affairs, Office of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission	AUC
8	Amb. Pequeno Ovidio Pequeno	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the African Union Liaison Office in Guinea Bissau	AULO Guinea Bissau
9	Ambassador Francisco Caetano Madeira	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of Mission	African Union Mission in Somalia
10	Brigadier General Sara Thomas Rwambali	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the African Union Liaison Office in South Sudan	AULO South Sudan
11	Amb. Hawa Ahmed Youssouf	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the African Union Liaison Office in Madagascar	AULO Madagascar
12	Amb. Zaina Nyiramata	Special Representative of the	AULO Chad
13	Prof. Mohamed El Hacen Lebatt	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the African Union Mission in Central Africa	SRCC and Head, MISAC
14	Amb. Zaina Nyiramata	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the African Union Liaison Office in Chad	SRCC AULO Chad
15	Professor Ibrahima Fall	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the African Union Liaison Office in Chad	AULO Burundi
16	Amb. A. Abarry	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the African Union Liaison Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	SRCC, AULO DRC
17	Ms. Prudence Ngwenya	Head of Human Resources & Youth Development Division, Human Resources, Science & Technology Department	AUC
18	Mr. Nicholas Ouma	Senior Youth Adviser, Human Resources, Science & Technology Department	AUC
19	Dr. Jean-Bosco Butera	Special Adviser and Chief of Staff Office of the Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security	AUC
20	Dr. George Mukundi	African Governance Architecture Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs	AUC
21	Mr. Olalekan T.Sulaimon Tella	Office of the Legal Counsel	AUC
22	Mr. Oumar Diop	Senior Policy Officer, Department of Social Affairs	AUC
23	Mr. Patrick Ndzana Olomo	Policy Expert, Investment & Resource Mobilisation, Department of Economic Affairs	AUC
24	Ms. Frehywat Gosheme	Administrative Assistant, CMPCRD	AUC
25	Ms. Woinsnet Getachew	Secretary, CMPCRD	AUC
26	Mr. Bobby King	Intern, CMPCRD	AUC
27	Mr. Taye Markos	Mail Runner, CMPCRD	AUC
28	Ms. Nadia Roguiai	Program Development and Resource Mobilisation Officer, CMPCRD	AUC
29	Mr. Elisio Benedito Jamine	Regional Desk Officer, CMPCRD	AUC
30	Mr. Pascal Yao Konan	Regional Desk Officer, CMPCRD	AUC

S/N	Name	Position	Organisation
31	Mr. Bonaventure Cakpo Guedegbe		
32	Mr. Mike Bugason	Advisor to AU Special Envoy for LRA, CMPCRD	AUC
33	Col. Cheikh F. Mady Dembele	Senior Officer on Conflict Management and Strategic Planning, CMPCRD, PSD	AUC
34	Mr. Ahmed Mahmoud Saber	Senior Political Officer, CMPCRD	AUC
35	Dr. Alhaji Sarjoh Bah	Ag. Head, CMPCRD	AUC
36	Mr Hamouda Kanu	Senior SSR Expert, Defence and Security Division, PSD	AUC
37	Dr. Joseph Chilengi	Presiding Officer, ECOSOCC	AU
38	Mr. Ngalem Eugene Nyuydine	Chairperson, Peace and Security Cluster, ECOSOCC	AUC
39	Ms. Sandra Adong Oder	Senior Policy Officer, CMPCRD	AUC
40	H.E Ambassador Catherine Mwangi	Chair of the AU PSC, Ambassador	
41	Mr. Joseph Vungo		Embassy of Kenya
42	Mr. George M. Orina		Embassy of Kenya
43	H.E. Ambassador James Idule-Amoko		Embassy of Uganda
44	H.E. Ambassador Elzein Ibrahim Hussein		Embassy of Sudan
45	H.E. Ambassador Osman Keh Kamara		Embassy of Sierra Leone
46	Mr. Abdul Karim Koroma		Embassy of Sierra Leone
47	Mr. Jonathan Las-Lamin		Embassy of Sierra Leone
48	Mr. Ali Berbash		Embassy of Libya
49	Mr. Fateh Beshna		Embassy of Libya
50	Mr. Adil Awad-Elsid		Embassy of Sudan
51	Mr. Moussa Sidibe		Embassy of Guinea
52	Mr. Thero Mokoti		Embassy of Botswana
53	Mr. Felix Biri hanyuma		Embassy of Burundi
54	Col. Ndore Rurinda		Embassy of Rwanda
55	Mr. Bonaventure Sawadogo		Embassy of Burkina Faso
56	Mr. Bague Badoun Sidonie Denise		Embassy of Burkina Faso
57	Mr. Patrick Gonzague		Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
58	Mr. Gotomo R. Anderson		Embassy of Liberia
59	Ms. Sayonara Maulubambo		Embassy of Angola
60	Dr. Cedric de Coning	Research Fellow, ACCORD/NUPI	ACCORD
61	Mr. Edward Mulbah	Director	Liberia Peacebuilding Office
62	Ms. Betty Sunday Ben	Coordinator	Women Monthly Forum for Peace Process
63	Mr. Moses Monday John	Executive Director	Organization for Non-Violence and Development
64	Ms. Faten Aggad- Clerx	Head of Programme	Africa's Change Dynamics
65	Mr. Andrew Lavali	Executive Director	Institute for Governance Reform

S/N	Name	Position	Organisation
66	George Tshionza Mata	Secretary General	Service d'Etudes, de Renforcement des Capacités et d'Appuis aux Organisations de la Société Civile et de la Base (SEROB)
67	Mr. Joseph Kalokoh	Public Relations Officer	African Trends
68	Mr. Nasser Katende	Executive Director	African Trends
69	Mr. Samuel Baker Tamale	Executive Secretary	African Trends
70	Bishop Macleod Baker Ochola II		Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative
71	Dr. Vasu Gounden	Founder and Executive Director	ACCORD
72	Mr. Senzo Ngubane	General Manager: Operations	ACCORD
73	Mr. Charles Nyuykonge	Senior Researcher	ACCORD
74	Mr. John Ahere	Coordinator: Peacebuilding	ACCORD
75	Ms. Bezawit Kefyalew		ACCORD
76	Mr. Emanuel Koudoubada	Executive Director	Vitalité
77	Mrs. Yabah Berte Karbo	Chief of Staff	Commission for Reconciliation & Victims Compensation
78	Mr. Andrew Thomas Lavali	Executive Director	Institute for Governance Reform
79	Mr. Jongi Joseph Klaas	First Secretary	South African
80	Ms. Belain Yoseph		Embassy of New Zealand
81	Prof. Cheryl Hendricks	Head, Department of Politics and International Studies	University of Johannesburg
82	Dr. Siphamandla Zondi	Professor: Department of Political Sciences	University of Pretoria
83	Dr. Philip Attuquayefio	Senior Research Fellow Legon Centre for International Affairs	University of Ghana
84	Prof. Chuck Call	Ass. Prof. International Relations Director, International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program, School of International Service,	American University, UNSG's advisory board on the Peacebuilding Fund
85	Dr. Martin Rupiya	Associate Professor for Institute of African Renaissance Studies	UNISA & Executive Director, The African Public Policy & Research Institute
86	Dr. Tony Karbo	Director	Karamoja Cluster Project, a UPEACE Africa Programme
87	Prince Ifor	President	Young African Leaders Forum, (YALF), South Africa
88	Ambassador Edith Grace Ssempala	Member Secretary General Advisory Group	UN
89	H.E. Ambassador Macharia Kamau	Chair, UN Peacebuilding Commission	UN Peacebuilding Commission
90	Mr. Sunday Babatunde	UNOCHA	UNOCHA
91	Prof. Said Adejumobi	Director, Subregional Office in Southern Africa, ECA	UN ECA
92	Ms. Minna Hojland	UN Liaison Officer	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)

S/N	Name	Position	Organisation
93	Mr. George Okutho	Director	ILO Country Office for Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan and Special Representative to the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa
94	Dr. Stefano Failla		United Nations Office to the AU
95	Dr. Yero Baldeh		African Development Bank (AFDB)
96	Ms. Raheemat Omoro Momodu	Head, Liaison Office to the AU	ECOWAS
97	Ms. Valentine Abegnonhou Atonde	Programme Officer	ECOWAS
98	Col. Sherif Ahmed Kemal	Head, Liaison Office to the AU	NARC
99	Col. Mohamed Barkat	Head, Liaison Office to the AU	EASFCOM
100	Ambassador Abuzeid El Hassan	Head, Liaison Office to the AU	IGAD
101	Ambassador Salvator Matata	Head, Liaison Office to the AU	COMESA
102	Mr. Moses Chrispus Okello	Conflict Analyst, Early Warning and Response Mechanism	IGAD
103	Mr. Jean Constantinesco	Second Secretary and Political Advisor	Delegation of the European Union to the African Union
104	Ms. Nuria Grigoriadis	Support to the African Union for the Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)	GIZ
105	Ms. Sophie Okalany (geb. Haarhaus)	Support to the African Union for the Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)	GIZ
106	Mr. Gerhard Mai	Support to the African Union for the Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)	GIZ
107	H.E Ambassador Mary Leonard	USAU Ambassador	Embassy of the US to the AU
108	Ms. Sheila Worth	USAU Rule of Law Advisor	Embassy of the US to the AU
109	Lieutenant Colonel Hosang Kim	Deputy Military Advisor	Embassy of the US to the AU
110	Ms. Julie Crowley	First Secretary	Embassy of Canada to Ethiopia
111	H.E Ambassador Mette Thygesen		Royal Danish Embassy
112	Ms. Samrawit Berhanu,	Senior Programme Officer	Royal Danish Embassy
113	Mr. Esben Als-Andersson,	Political Assistant	Royal Danish Embassy
114	Mrs. Janina Hasse-Mohsine		Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

S/N	Name	Position	Organisation
115	Mr. Chris Barker		Embassy of the United Kingdom
116	Mr. Oliver Humbel		Embassy of Switzerland
117	Ms. Annette Leijenaar		Institute for Security Studies
118	Mr. Gustavo de Carvalho		Institute for Security Studies
119	Ms. Amanda Lucey		Institute for Security Studies
120	Ms. Kgalalelo Nganje		Institute for Security Studies
121	Brigadier General (Rtd) Riana Paneras		Institute for Security Studies
122	Ms. Meressa Kahsu		Institute for Security Studies
123	Mr. John Karlsrud		NUPI
124	Dr. Linda Darkwa		Training for Peace Secretariat, Addis Ababa
125	Ms. Natasja Rupensinghe		NUPI
126	Dr. Ndiaye Michelle		Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University
127	Dr. Sunday Okello		Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University
128	Dr. Lulseged Abebe		International Alert
129	Ms. Clelia Kakunze		International Alert



Peace and Security Department
African Union Commission
P. O. Box 3243, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Tel.: (251-11) 551 93 21
Fax: (251 11) 551 93 21
Email: situationroom@africa-union.org
Website: www.peaceau.org
follow us on Twitter: @AU_PSD